

HUMANITARIAN NEEDS IN AFGHANISTAN

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, JULY 27, 1989

Serial No. 101-12

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Hunger



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1989

21-813

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

H961-30

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER

MICKEY LELAND, Texas, *Chairman*

TONY P. HALL, Ohio
LEON E. PANETTA, California
VIC FAZIO, California
PETER H. KOSTMAYER, Pennsylvania
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
BOB CARR, Michigan
TIMOTHY J. PENNY, Minnesota
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
MIKE ESPY, Mississippi
FLOYD H. FLAKE, New York
ELIZABETH J. PATTERSON, South Carolina
THOMAS M. FOGLIETTA, Pennsylvania
ALBERT G. BUSTAMANTE, Texas
MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
LES AuCOIN, Oregon

BILL EMERSON, Missouri
Vice Chairman
MARGE ROUKEMA, New Jersey
SID MORRISON, Washington
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
ROBERT F. (Bob) SMITH, Oregon
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
FREDERICK S. UPTON, Michigan
WALLY HERGER, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California
FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

MIRANDA G. KATSOYANNIS, *Chief of Staff*
ROBERT L. JACKSON, *Minority Staff Director*

CONTENTS

Hearing held in Washington, DC, July 27, 1989	Page 1
Statement of:	
Crandall, Larry, Mission Director, Afghanistan Operations, U.S. Agency for International Development	8
Emerson, Hon. Bill, a Representative in Congress from the State of Missouri, opening statement of	11
Flake, Hon. Floyd H., a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, opening statement of	11
Gilman, Hon. Benjamin A., a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, opening statement of	7
Haq, Cynthia, M.D., representative, International Rescue Committee, Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, accompanied by Catherine O'Neill	24
Herger, Hon. Wally, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, opening statement of	6
McNulty, Hon. Michael R., a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, opening statement of	1
Norman, Henry, president, Volunteers in Technical Assistance, VITA, accompanied by Mohammad Sediq	22
O'Neill, Catherine, chair, Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children	26
Tomsen, Ambassador Peter, Special Envoy to the Afghan Resistance, U.S. Department of State, accompanied by Richard Castrodale, Bureau of International Organization Affairs	2
Prepared statements, letters, supplemental material, et cetera:	
Afghanistan: Questioning the future	128
Crandall, Larry, A.I.D. Representative for Afghan Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development:	
Additional questions for, submitted by:	
Hon. Michael R. McNulty	73
Hon. Elizabeth J. Patterson	79
Hon. Bill Emerson	82
Prepared statement of	67
Dorgan, Hon. Byron L., a Representative in Congress from the State of North Dakota, prepared statement of	38
Emerson, Hon. Bill, a Representative in Congress from the State of Missouri, prepared statement of	40
Haq, Cynthia, M.D., representative, International Rescue Committee, Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, accompanied by Catherine O'Neill:	
Additional questions for, submitted by Hon. Michael McNulty	126
Prepared statement of	112
Status of Afghan women and children refugees, March 1989	115
McNulty, Hon. Michael R., a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, prepared statement of	33
Norman, Henry R., president, Volunteers in Technical Assistance, VITA:	
Additional questions for, submitted by Hon. Michael McNulty	111
Agriculture sector support project, briefing paper, July 3, 1989	98
Prepared statement of	93
Tomsen, Ambassador Peter, Special Envoy, Afghan Resistance, U.S. De- partment of State:	
Additional questions for, submitted by:	
Hon. Michael McNulty	53
Hon. Elizabeth J. Patterson	56

IV

Prepared statements, letters, supplemental material, et cetera—Continued	
Tomsen, Ambassador Peter, Special Envoy, Afghan Resistance, U.S. Department of State—Continued	
Additional questions for, submitted by—Continued	Page
Hon. Bill Emerson	57
Prepared statement of	43

HUMANITARIAN NEEDS IN AFGHANISTAN

THURSDAY, JULY 27, 1989

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 1310-A, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Michael McNulty presiding.

Members present: Representatives Dorgan, Penny, Flake, Patterson, Foglietta, Emerson, Gilman, Smith of Oregon, and Herger.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. McNULTY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. McNULTY. The hearing will come to order. My name is Mike McNulty. I represent the 23rd Congressional District of the State of New York. I bring you greetings from Chairman Mickey Leland who, unfortunately, could not be with us today and who asked me to chair this hearing in his absence.

I welcome all of you to today's hearing on United States and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. The 10 years of war in Afghanistan have resulted in 2 million displaced persons within the country and 7 million refugees having fled to Iran and Pakistan. The upheaval shows no sign of abatement. Between March and April of this year, 25,000 new refugees arrived in Pakistan alone.

When the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan last February in accordance with the Geneva accords, many assumed that the cobbled government would fall immediately and millions of Afghan refugees would pour out of Pakistan to return home.

Today, however, 5 months after the withdrawal of the last Soviet armed forces, civil conflict continues between supporters of the cobbled government and the mujahideen forces who opposed the government.

Whether through political settlement of a military victory, there must be peace and stability in Afghanistan before its 9 million displaced persons and refugees will return to their homes and begin rehabilitation and reconstruction of the nation.

The cost of reconstruction will be high. Roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, and villages must all be rebuilt, and the country's agriculture infrastructure must be redeveloped.

As we make plans for the resettlement and reconstruction in Afghanistan, the impact on the women and children must be given the highest priority. Women and children make up 75 percent of the refugee camps' populations.

In 1985, Afghanistan had the highest infant mortality rate, the highest under 5 mortality rate and one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world. The illiteracy rate for women is presently 95 percent.

Our investment in Afghanistan's development must include access for women to basic education, health care, and economic opportunities. Today's hearing will focus on several key questions.

Among them: What is the most expedient way to achieve peace? What is the U.S. role in the resettlement and reconstruction efforts?

[The prepared statement of Mr. McNulty appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 33.]

Mr. McNULTY. I want to welcome the first panel: Ambassador Peter Tomsen, Special Envoy to the Afghan Resistance from the U.S. Department of State who is accompanied by Richard Castrodale, Bureau of International Organization Affairs also of the State Department; and Larry Crandall, the Mission Director, Afghanistan Operations for U.S. A.I.D.

Welcome gentlemen. Ambassador, you may proceed in any manner you wish.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR PETER TOMSEN, SPECIAL ENVOY TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY RICHARD CASTRODALE, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Ambassador TOMSEN. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. I would like to begin by reading my statement. My colleagues and I welcome this opportunity to appear before your committee to review developments in Afghanistan, U.S. bilateral and U.N. multilateral assistance programs and U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.

I would be pleased to discuss my recent 3-week visit to Pakistan, during which, as U.S. Special Envoy to the Afghan Resistance, I met hundreds of Afghans, individually and collectively.

Many travelled to the three Pakistan-Afghanistan border points I visited to provide their personal views to me firsthand on what is going on inside the country. My conversations with Afghans in the past 3 weeks at times reflected their traditional differences along tribal, regional, ethnic, and other lines.

Such divisions in Afghan society are familiar to many Americans who have read popular novels, history, and literature about Afghanistan. Yet, there was one common objective shared by all Afghans that I met along the frontier. That was their bitter opposition to the Soviet-imposed regime in Kabul led by Najib and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the PDPA, which has been superimposed by an outside power on Afghanistan, maintained in power for 8 years by a foreign army and by a country which today, through massive inflows of military assistance, is attempting to maintain it in power.

Since the Afghan resistance forced the Soviets to withdraw their forces, Moscow has pumped in unprecedented amounts of military hardware. The Soviets have created a virtual airbridge to Kabul.

They have transferred over 600 APC's and tanks, hundreds of SCUD surface-to-surface missiles, each with 2,000 pound warheads,

and thousands of tons of artillery, aircraft and ordinance, plus other weapons and munitions. These supplies dwarf the assistance going to the resistance.

The PDPA regime has abandoned the mountains and most of Afghanistan's valleys in the last several months, basically fortifying themselves in major towns and cities. With the departure of the Soviet forces, the resistance has had to adjust to a more conventional kind of warfare. This has taken time.

After the initial weeks, the resistance has avoided frontal assaults on these fortified positions. Instead it is surrounding them, attempting to cut off connected roads and airfields and to negotiate the surrender of garrisons.

Since February, the resistance has made slow, incremental progress in this strategy but to date has made no single dramatic success.

Mr. Chairman, time is on the resistance side. It will prevail. The Afghan people reject Najib and the PDPA as a regime imposed by Afghanistan's powerful northern neighbor. The PDPA regime will eventually meet the same fate as many other Afghans placed in power by outsiders over the centuries.

The war has seriously disrupted the Afghan economy. Recent U.N. analysis supports and suggests that production of wheat, Afghanistan's most important crop, may be less than one-half of prewar levels.

Irrigation systems have been severely damaged. Mines have made agriculture land unusable, villages unsafe, and transport difficult. Livestock has been decimated and supplies of seed and fertilizer seriously reduced.

Agriculture exports have fallen 40 percent since 1977. Most of the traditional trade ties through Pakistan broken or impaired. In the rural areas, social services were historical minimal but now have been virtually eliminated except where supported by international efforts.

Since 1985, the United States, through A.I.D., has been providing humanitarian assistance to Afghans inside Afghanistan. It is the only real bilateral aid program working inside Afghanistan. No other country has one.

In the fall of 1988, the A.I.D. strategy has revised from providing assistance to all liberated areas of Afghanistan. It now emphasizes areas to which the majority of the refugees are likely to return.

We expect the U.N. and the World Bank to take the lead in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, a task that requires greater resources than donors can supply bilaterally. The objectives of A.I.D.'s program through 1991 are to meet the pressing needs of repatriation and rehabilitation.

The priority is ensuring food security and restoring agricultural production. To achieve these goals, we plan to support projects to clear mines, improve transportation capacity, supply fertilizer and seed, and provide essential commodities.

A key element of our strategy is and will remain to reduce narcotics production. As we work toward repatriation, the international community must still provide adequate resources for the care and maintenance of the refugees in place.

A total of 3.2 million Afghan refugees live in approximately 230 camps in Pakistan. Contrary to what we had all hoped, they have not yet gone home. Indeed, an additional 70,000 refugees have fled to Pakistan in recent months, primarily to escape fighting around Jalalabad.

In the current fiscal year, the United States is contributing \$20.5 million for care and maintenance programs, \$5 million for ICRC's emergency medical program and \$2.5 million for the U.N. trust fund. We have also donated \$435 million in food assistance for Afghans to the World Food Program.

The United Nations has done an excellent job of mobilizing resources for the refugee camps in Pakistan. However, much work remains to be done on building the capacity to support the eventual repatriation of the refugees.

The U.N. coordinator for Afghanistan mobilized contributions of nearly \$900 million from 30 donor countries in fiscal year 1989, although this figure is exaggerated by valuing the \$600 million in-kind Soviet pledge at the official exchange rate.

We are working with the U.N. system on the ground in Pakistan to help the U.N. get ready to use these resources for repatriation and reconstruction.

Regarding the return of the refugees, Mr. Congressman, I regret to inform that my personal conversations with refugees in Pakistan produced one uniform answer: the great bulk will not return until the Communist regime in Kabul is gone.

To date, only a very small percentage have returned; others have arrived from areas of continuing conflict in Afghanistan to replace them. My own judgment is the great bulk of the refugees will return only when the PDPA relinquishes power through a political settlement or otherwise.

In the letter which was sent to me regarding this testimony, I was asked to describe U.S. policy. The United States has pursued four consistent goals on Afghanistan since the Soviets commenced their brutal occupation in December 1979: withdrawal of Soviet forces; self-determination for the Afghan people; return of the refugees in safety and honor; restoration of Afghanistan's sovereignty and independence.

The first goal, Soviet withdrawal, has been accomplished. The Afghans themselves won the victory. Pakistan and U.S. support was vital. The three other goals remain to be achieved.

During the June visit of Prime Minister Bhutto to the United States, President Bush declared,

The mujahideen struggle for self-determination goes on, a goal that both the United States and Pakistan continue to support.

Prime Minister Bhutto and I discussed ways to encourage the political solution to Afghanistan that would lead to a nonaligned representative government willing to live in peace with its neighbors, to replace the illegitimate regime in Kabul.

The United States and Pakistan will continue to explore any serious avenue toward this end.

The United States, Pakistan, and the resistance stand for a political settlement that will transfer power away from the PDPA to an Afghan entity truly representative of the Afghan people.

The settlement should satisfy the objectives of self-determination, return of the refugees and the re-emergence of an independent

Afghan nation, not one under the influence of an outside power but one that has good relations with all of its neighbors.

The resistance needs our continuing support, Mr. Congressman, to maintain a position of strength as it pursues a political settlement incorporating these objectives.

The United States welcomed the creation of the Afghan interim government in late February as an important step. We encourage the leadership of the Afghan interim government to do everything possible to broaden its base of support to include all major elements of Afghan societies such as Shias, commanders, and Shuras inside Afghanistan and prominent Afghans abroad.

We urge its development as a representative body, a valid alternative and replacement for the illegitimate Kabul regime imposed and protected by an outside power. My recent talks with AIG leaders and many other Afghans reveal that notwithstanding many problems, the AIG has staffed many of its ministries whose services are relevant to a struggle.

It is beginning to forge additional links with Shuras and commanders inside Afghanistan and to implement new assistance activities and rehabilitation programs on its own.

Regarding Pakistan, an object or subject that also came up in the letter, Pakistan's relations with the resistance both political and military were forged early in the resistance struggle.

The Afghans are clearly grateful for Pakistan's sustained help. During her talks in Washington, Prime Minister Bhutto stated,

Pakistan remains committed to a political solution of the Afghan program, whereby the brave people of Afghanistan will have the right to freely choose their own government without interference from outside. Pakistan's commitment to peace and democracy are fundamental.

Regarding the Soviet Union, in 1986, President Gorbachev, at the then party Congress, termed Afghanistan in public remarks "a bleeding wound." That wound was inflicted by Moscow. Soviet blood is no longer flowing, but Afghan blood is.

Moscow is in a position to apply the tourniquet. We urge the Soviet Union to cooperate actively in achieving a political settlement that recognizes the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government.

Regarding the U.N., the Afghans themselves must work out the future political course of their country. We do not believe it is either appropriate or possible for the U.N. to try to force a settlement in Afghanistan at this time.

The current role of a special representative of the secretary accompanying UNGO map observers is appropriate for now. He is in the area actively sounding out parties, probing for openings, and available to work with the parties when or if an opportunity arises.

Mr. Congressman, here in Washington, we have just concluded productive talks with Pakistan on Afghanistan at the experts-level. We will be conducting further exchanges with the Soviets on Afghanistan in the coming weeks.

We hope our Soviet colleagues will adopt a more constructive approach than heretofore in cooperating to produce a political settlement that permits self-determination in Afghanistan, free of outside interference.

We remain confident that the U.S. policy of working toward a political settlement while continuing our support for the resistance will be successful if we have the patience and steadfastness to stay the course.

Mr. Congressman, if I may, before ending here, just refer to a map which has recently been declassified which I think might be before you, it illustrates what I found in my 3-week trip to these border areas of Afghanistan that 80 to 90 percent of the country is not administered by the regime.

It has fallen under the control of resistance leaders, either commanders or Shuras in local areas. There is a difference even between the situation earlier this year and now. The light red denotes areas which have fallen to the resistance in the last several months.

There is a process that is incremental but it is countrywide where even the dark red areas which are left with the Kabul regime are slowly falling due to resistance pressures. This is important on the humanitarian aid side as well as the military side.

I found that thousands of trucks and buses were going into Afghanistan from Pakistan bringing in food, clothing, objects to increase agriculture production. ACLU, an outfit that is funded by A.I.D. and has over 90 trucks has run 129 convoys into provinces around Kabul and throughout the southern swath of Afghanistan in the last couple of months.

So there is activity picking up since the Soviets withdrew in February on the humanitarian and economic side which is quite substantial throughout Afghanistan. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Tomsen appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 43.]

Mr. McNULTY. Thank you very much for that testimony, Ambassador. While we will not go to questions until all the members of the panel have made their opening statement, I would like to recognize my colleagues who have joined us; Congressman Smith of Oregon, Congressman Herger of California, and Congressman Gilman of New York.

I would ask any of my colleagues at this point in time if they would like to make an opening statement. Yes, Mr. Herger.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WALLY HERGER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. HERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you for holding this hearing on the problems facing the Afghan people. This is clearly an important region of the world.

Hopefully, this hearing should give us an opportunity to begin to map out the type of long-term strategy that will best help the Afghan people to regain their independence and self-sufficiency.

I'd like to begin my statements by expressing my concern with some comments made in material that was sent to my office by the majority committee staff. This information stated, "Mujahideen, although supported by Pakistan and the United States, do not have the popular support of the Afghans themselves."

While it might be true that the mujahideen may not be widely popular among some of the residents of the capital city of Kabul, I

believe that it is simply inaccurate to, therefore, conclude that they are not popular among the general populous.

The populous has been supporting the mujahideen for more than a decade, not only with their hearts and minds but with their food which has been extremely limited and with their very lives.

Tens of thousands of Afghan pheasants have been killed while fighting to regain their freedom from the Communist regime in Kabul. Mujahideen present represent nearly all of the major ethnic and religious groups of Afghanistan and regularly pay visits to the refugee camps in Pakistan where they are given a hero's welcome.

Additionally, the simple fact that around one quarter of the population has fled the country suggests that the support for the current regime is nearly nonexistent. Perhaps some of our witnesses could comment on this issue.

Mapping out a long-term strategy is important. In so doing, we need to consider focusing our assistance toward solutions that will have both short- and long-term benefits for their country, including providing incentives for a vibrant free market system and encouraging private land holdings which will maximize agricultural production.

These are the types of approaches that have proven successful around the globe and will be the ones that will directly, I feel, benefit the Afghan people themselves. A Marxist, political and economic system such as that which the Kabul government would impose has proven itself time and time again to be incompatible with achieving food, self-sufficiency in combatting hunger. Thank you.

Mr. McNULTY. Thank you, Mr. Herger.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McNULTY. Mr. Gilman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for arranging this hearing. It comes at an appropriate time as we are trying to decide in what direction we should be going with regard to our future policies in Afghanistan.

The issue of refugee assistance in Afghanistan is certainly an important one especially because of the flip-flop in terms of support for the mujahideen that summon the media and think tanks are beginning to take.

It reminds us relatively new knee jerk critical approach to some of the areas in the Middle East that we've seen in the last year or so. There's been talk of the threat of Islamic fundamentalism getting the upper hand if the mujahideen win the war.

No one has ever been at all certain of the outcome of supporting the freedom fighters, except that we have and still hope for an Afghanistan run by the Afghans themselves. In a majority's briefing paper for the hearing, there's talk of the improvements that the Communists have brought about for women.

Along with many of my colleagues, I'm a strong supporter of women in development programs in other ways to empower

women, but communism certainly isn't the outstanding method in doing that.

A knee jerk fear of Islam and Islamic world view is certainly not justified. There is respect for women within the Islamic culture; however, there are certain segments of the Afghani society just as in ours that still holds older traditional beliefs, not primitive beliefs but older traditional beliefs.

I believe that there is greater hope for a pluralistic society within an Islamic-based government than a Communist-based one. Women won't have a voice in a Communist society unless some ideologue decides to allow it.

I look forward to hearing from our panelists this morning. I thank you again for raising this issue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McNULTY. Thank you, Mr. Gilman. Now we'll proceed with the opening statement of Larry Crandall from U.S. A.I.D.

STATEMENT OF LARRY CRANDALL, MISSION DIRECTOR, AFGHANISTAN OPERATIONS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. CRANDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The A.I.D. program in Afghanistan, the humanitarian program, began in 1984, late 1984 in response to a number of concerns that were heard in many areas of the countryside that there were growing shortages of food throughout the country.

In December of 1984, the administration decided that, given the number of refugees that were already in Pakistan and Iran, something totalling 5 million, I believe, that we really didn't want to see anymore people leaving the country when there are already 5 million out.

From the policy point of view, an exodus from the country would obviously have great effect, a detrimental effect to our interest in supporting the mujahideen. So we sent a five-person team out, to look very closely at the question of hunger and food availability in the country and came to the conclusion that there were no major problems at that time, that most of what we were hearing was in fact rumor.

What that study led to was a recognition that while there may not be a particular problem at that point, we had to make sure that there were no problems that resulted in the future that might hurt our objectives.

So in early 1985, I was asked to go out and look at the question of how we might put an aid program together. I did that and that was really the antecedent, if you will, for the many things that we're doing now.

I might go over a few of those things and simply amplify what the Ambassador has already said. We thought in 1985 that while it was clear that the mujahideen could fight and fight successfully, that our program should be nationwide in scope if possible and seek to give a dimension to the resistance, a political dimension, if you will, which they didn't have.

If we gave them nationwide programs, they could demonstrate an ability to minister throughout the country as well as an ability to fight. So that's what we did. We worked very closely in the early

months of 1985 with the then alliance, the predecessor of the interim government in discussing agricultural programs, health programs, education programs, you name it, through a very tedious, I might add, process of negotiation with our friends in the resistance.

We designed major programs in all the areas that I mentioned. The program has evolved from 1985 from some \$5 million, \$6 million that we provided then to well in excess of \$100 million this year.

The ability to have a program grow at that rate and to that magnitude is really a function of the support which the Afghans have given it and their interest in seeing that it worked.

It's not a function of how smart the American bureaucrats were or how smart the Pakistani supporters were or are; it was really a function of their strong desire to seek conditions, humanitarian conditions improved inside their own country.

We have built bridges. We've built roads. We've opened countless numbers of schools. We've trained thousands of health workers. We've put nearly 30,000 people through various kinds of literacy programs.

We have on our staff now over 8,000 people who essentially fill civil administrative type positions for the most part throughout the country and not in Pakistan. What this does, I think, is demonstrate that while there have been certain losses accruing to the resistance over the last few months in the media, in fact they have a very extensive administrative capacity to administer humanitarian programs just about anywhere they wish throughout the country to save a few cities which Najib still controls.

My own view and it's one that derives from 2 years of living in the country and nearly 4½ years of working on resistance humanitarian problems is that while they are very divisive at times on key political issues of interest to them, there is a set of issues on which there is little divisiveness or fractionness and those issues have to do with improving the lot and lives of people inside the country.

I think the statement which I have given you has a lot of detail in it. I won't go into that unless you wish to. I see that the humanitarian program, while I'm very close to it and obviously have vested interest, is one which the Afghans can be terribly proud of.

They've made it work; we haven't. The Congress has always provided the funds—and I might add, you are to be congratulated as well. The Afghan interim government, which we hear so much about, has begun the process of adopting some of the projects or all of the projects which we have supported over the last few years.

We and they, knowing the difficulties of putting an interim government together, have no desire whatsoever to let anything which may involve any interim government impact adversely on our ability to delivery humanitarian services.

So we and they are going very carefully and very slowly on the process of turning over responsibility from the various technical committees that were developed under the old alliance to responsibility for the Afghan interim government and its ministries.

With those few comments, Mr. Chairman, I will stop.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crandall appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 67.]

Mr. McNULTY. Thank you very much. I know you both addressed this generally, but I'll just start with this basic question about attitudes in the country and seek your reaction to the article which appeared in the Washington Post this morning about changing attitudes in Afghanistan, and quoting one individual as saying we want peace and security and don't care much about politics and want to get back to farming and producing and saying that that's the prevalent attitude now, quoting further the apparent changes in public opinion here corroborated by foreign diplomats and A.I.D. workers who monitor Afghan politics pose a significant challenge to the Bush administration stated policy of encouraging a military victory by the mujahideen.

Even among the mujahideen supporters interviewed here and in Kandahar in the south, no one expressed the confidence that the Pakistan-based guerrilla alliance can unite sufficiently to provide an alternative to the Najibullah government. What is your general reaction to the tenor of that whole article?

Ambassador TOMSEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say, first of all if I can, specifically that we do stand for political settlement as is stated in our transcript today and by President Bush separately.

We see no way, though, that the PDPA can play a role in that political settlement. They must step down and in a government truly representative of the Afghan people that has not had its hands bloodied directly in the eyes of the Afghans and also through 8 years of a brutal Soviet occupation in which 1.3 million Afghans died and over 6 million Afghans were driven out of their country.

This regime in Kabul is associated with that period in the eyes of the Afghans. The Afghans are not people who forget. If I can quote from this article myself, there's one passage which I think speaks volumes:

In discussing this regime, even senior officials of the ruling party concede that had earned the enmity of most Afghans with its brutal role in the first years after it took power in the 1978 coup and with its 9 years of alignment with the Soviet occupation.

The official conceded that the wars brutality has left many Afghans unwilling to reconcile with the government. I recently returned from China, Mr. Chairman. I spent 7 years in China. I was most recently DCM there.

There is an intelligence network in Beijing especially but also in China's major cities which is very efficient. If you have a correspondent especially from a major American newspaper going around town asking questions, you can be sure that the people he or she talks to are going to be interviewed by intelligence officials after they talk.

Their comments are not going to be spontaneous or reflect their own views for the most part. Of course, there's exceptions, but the Afghans in Kabul know this is the case, know that they're being watched and know that the regime is the type of regime which will take steps against them.

So what we see here, I think, is a collection as you mentioned of opinions and attitudes purportedly reflecting the ideas of people in Kabul. Even a senior official of the regime has said that the regime is not popular and it cannot get reconciled with the Afghan people.

Mr. McNULTY. Would you like to comment on this?

Mr. CRANDALL. I know the author of the article in this morning's newspaper. He's been out there several times. I have seen him write articles in the past that were, shall we say, much more acceptable from my point of view. In these cases, he has interviewed people not in Kabul but along the border and inside Afghanistan when he has travelled there.

I guess what this points out is when you talk to partisans, you are going to get a partisan point of view. My guess is that that's what he has done. He has talked to partisans here.

He has drawn conclusions without offering the balance to his article which a few mentions of how people from the other side view things would have provided. I think the point that the Ambassador made with respect to high level officials of the PDPA who have also decried the ability of their own regime to create a base of support in the countryside are also very telling and very interesting politically.

Mr. McNULTY. Thank you very much. I've been joined by two more of my colleagues; Congressman Flake of New York and Congressman Emerson of Missouri. At this point in time, I would like to recognize the distinguished vice chairman of the Select Committee on Hunger, Mr. Emerson.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL EMERSON, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI**

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a statement that I would like to submit for the record immediately following your opening statement. I would ask unanimous consent to do that.

I apologize for my tardiness in arriving here and that I didn't hear the opening statement of our witnesses. We didn't know at the point this hearing was scheduled what the legislative schedule of the day would be and how tight things would be. I apologize to you for that. One of the things here in Congress is that we never know as we schedule things three and four weeks hence what may be the agenda for a given day.

Because I was not here to hear your opening statements, I would, if I could, Mr. Chairman, defer asking my questions and yield to the colleagues who were here. I would come back at the end, if I may. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Emerson appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 40.]

Mr. McNULTY. That's acceptable. Thank you very much, Congressman Emerson. Congressman Flake of New York.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD H. FLAKE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you very much. We'd like to welcome the Ambassador to the Select Committee on Hunger.

One question, Mr. Ambassador. You just stated that you did not think a political settlement was necessarily possible. Am I correct?

Ambassador TOMSEN. I think that our policy is for political settlement, sir. That is our objective and we stand for that.

Mr. FLAKE. One of the concerns that has been raised has been that the United States should change its role and perhaps put

more emphasis on diplomacy, and some creative and flexible processes. As a result the United States might be involved in trying to bring about some resolution versus an involvement in supplying weaponry to what is considered to be a war with torn population.

Can you give us an opinion on that on the basis of what you see?

Ambassador TOMSEN. Yes, Mr. Congressman. Our policy is to continue to support the resistance and their just struggle to replace this foreign-imposed regime in Kabul. We are certain that this struggle will succeed.

If you look at the map—I don't know if you all have copies—it shows to what extent the regime has been shriveled down to just a few urban centers with LOC's connecting them. Those are being continually cut and will increasingly be.

We have an active diplomacy afoot. As I mentioned, we met with the Pakistanis for talks on Monday and Tuesday in Washington in which we were talking about this very subject. We are seeing the Soviets in Stockholm this weekend to discuss Afghanistan.

We will give our view which is we are for political settlement but peace and normalcy can only return to Afghanistan when Najibullah and his regime step down and we have a regime that is broadly representative of the Afghan people.

Mr. FLAKE. Is there a feeling that there are persons or groups in position that if he does step down, that they are prepared to move forward to reestablish a government that is acceptable to the people there?

Ambassador TOMSEN. Mr. Congressman, the Afghan interim government has been formed. It is in Peshawar now in exile. It would be ready to step in. It is representing the most important manifestation of the resistance. It does not include all resistance elements. We are encouraging it to widen its basis of support to include them.

Eventually, hopefully after the PDPA regime steps down, there will be a regime. The Afghan interim government, a broader coalition, which does not include the PDPA, which will represent the Afghan people.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McNULTY. Thank you, Congressman Flake. I would also like to welcome our colleague, the Congressman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Foglietta, to the hearing. Tom, you don't have an opening statement?

Mr. FOGLIETTA. No, sir.

Mr. McNULTY. OK.

Congressman Smith.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Ambassador, gentlemen. What percentage of assistance, humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan comes from the United States?

Ambassador TOMSEN. Let me yield to my colleague.

Mr. CRANDALL. The vast majority of the humanitarian assistance which people inside Afghanistan and resistance control there is received comes from the U.S. Government.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. So \$100 million is 90 percent of it, 80 percent?

Mr. CRANDALL. Excuse me, sir?

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. The \$100 million you mentioned is 90 percent, 80 percent? What is the vast majority?

Mr. CRANDALL. I don't know that we can give you an accurate figure on that because there are a lot of difficulties in disaggregating data which is available. A lot of data isn't available which would allow us to do that.

What we know is that we are the only ones who are interested on a day to day basis doing it on a large scale with the Afghans. Therefore, we are the ones that they look to continuously.

There are a few European PVO's who operate out there and a few of them get money from their governments to work inside Afghanistan. The French and British are most notable in that group, though the Germans provide a little bit.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. And Pakistan?

Mr. CRANDALL. The government of Pakistan does provide its good offices and logistical support for a lot of humanitarian activities inside Afghanistan. They do not have a line item budget, if you will, that supports them the way we do.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. Ambassador, is it the policy of this government that we try to equate the rather substantial service of arms from the Soviet Union to the Kabul government? Is that our policy?

I want you to remind us again of how much military assistance is coming from the Soviet Union to support the public government.

Ambassador TOMSEN. Yes, sir. As I mentioned in my opening statement, what the Soviets are sending dwarfs anything going to the resistance for multiple sources.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Give me an idea?

Ambassador TOMSEN. Yes. The Soviets, since they pulled out on February 15 have sent in over 100 tanks. They have sent in over 600 APC's. They have sent in numerous artillery pieces, ammunition.

Daily there are bombing missions that are conducted over Afghan soil around Jalalabad. It's 24 hours a day in which ordnance is pushed out of cargo aircraft at 30,000 feet. This comes in enormous quantities.

There are new weapons that have been introduced by the Soviet Union including SCUD missiles each one with a 2,000-pound warhead which are not precise. They are fired from the Kabul area into southern parts of Afghanistan and they land more on villages or in agricultural fields or bridges more than they land on mujahideen. They are essentially a terror weapon.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. What do we do?

Ambassador TOMSEN. We count over 500 of those that have been fired so far around southern Afghanistan.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. What is our support?

Ambassador TOMSEN. Mr. Congressman, our support for the resistance is continuing. You see the Soviets fanning and the Najibullah regime constantly fanning the peace idea, the peace campaign.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. How much money?

Ambassador TOMSEN. We would have to go into closed session to get into that type of detail. The Soviets were offered negative symmetry before the Geneva Conference in April of last year by us. They turned us down.

Perhaps they had in mind doing what they've done, this enormous influx of military equipment to marry up with the regime strategy of moving into five or six enclaves in the country to fortify them and try to hold out.

We now reject negative symmetry. It is not acceptable. We will set no deadlines for our assistance.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. How much humanitarian assistance does the Soviet Union provide to Afghanistan?

Ambassador TOMSEN. They are sending in, we estimate, about 300,000 metric tons of food per year to supply civilian and military PDPA and NPDPA controlled areas. They are also forced to foot the bill, of course, for many other things in these areas that the PDPA still controls because there's virtually no source of internal revenue for it.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. How does that equate to the \$100 million of humanitarian aid that we're sending?

Ambassador TOMSEN. We estimate that the Soviets are yearly sending in \$2 to \$3 billion worth of assistance to Afghanistan.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Two to 3 million?

Ambassador TOMSEN. Two to 3 billion, sir.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Billion dollars?

Ambassador TOMSEN. Per year.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Is that total, military and humanitarian or is that—

Ambassador TOMSEN. This estimate includes both humanitarian and military total.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I guess the point remains that you've made through these questions that while we'd all like to see a just peace, with that kind of pressure coming continuously from the Soviet Union, how is that possible?

The next question, of course, is, from the point of view of this committee, are we providing enough in aid? If not, what should we be providing in assistance, in humanitarian assistance, that we are not providing today?

Ambassador TOMSEN. With the support of Congress, we have various requests on the humanitarian side, sir, and also for military assistance before the relevant committees. We need to continue to show American resolve to the Soviets and support to the resistance, not only to those audiences but to other audiences.

This is a critical moment as the regime slowly loses more ground incrementally. Their position today is much worse than it was on February 15 when the Soviets pulled out. It's going to be worse in the upcoming months.

I'm not going to predict any immediate victory. Their strategy of moving into enclaves and fortifying them and fighting off assaults has prolonged the war. The end is clear. The resistance will prevail if we are steadfast in our assistance.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Thank you.

Mr. McNULTY. Congressman Herger.

Mr. HERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If we could follow up just on this last question, could you go into this a little bit more? You mentioned the position of the Soviet supported government is worse. Would you mind going into that?

Ambassador TOMSEN. What I will give you is what we received from intelligent sources and what I've heard all along the frontiers that these three points, they are kind of windows on Afghanistan that I travelled to in Pakistan, Chitral, Peshawar, and Quetta in the last 3 weeks.

There are garrisons that continue to fall in the few areas that the regime still controls. Mir Bacha Kot is the main district town just north of Kabul. The whole garrison defected to the resistance with nine tanks 1½ months ago.

Kohsan, an area of nine security outposts between Herat in the Iranian border went under about a month ago. 400 hundred regime soldiers defected or took off into Iran. The whole area between Herat and Iran is now in resistance hands.

There was a major attack last week in the Khowst area in which a brigade was overrun by the resistance. The resistance then moved on to Khowst and has surrounded Khowst. In Qandahar—this is a major city in the south—roads to Qandahar are cut in many places.

In the last month, the airfield has come under increasing attack by indirect fire. There will be more fighting in the upcoming weeks and months. This is incremental. It's not publicized as much as it should be. The fighting around Jalalabad is.

What happened there was, on two occasions in the last 30 or so days, the regime has come out with some tanks and moved 5 to 7 kilometers toward Samarkhel which was a previous divisional headquarters of the regime which has been totally destroyed in April by the resistance.

They then pulled back after they took considerable losses in tanks and APC's. They've come out again. This is portrayed in the press and in Kabul propaganda as a great victory for the regime.

"Debacle at Jalalabad" is one of the headlines. It's not a debacle. Fighting is swirling around Jalalabad. Jalalabad is still under siege by the resistance. The road to Kabul is cut. The resistance is trying to cut it completely.

There is heavy fighting probably, more fighting in the last few days than at any time during the war in the Jalalabad area. The regime is unable to move beyond this general area other than coming out of Jalalabad in sort of active defensive forays and going back.

So incrementally, just to sum up, sir, the direction is clear. The few areas that the regime still controls are under constant pressure. Garrisons continue to fall. I predict that—I'm not going to set any deadlines—that we will see some significant victories in the months ahead.

Mr. HERGER. This is happening despite the fact the Soviets are pumping, you say, \$2 or \$3 billion a year into tempting the support?

Ambassador TOMSEN. Yes.

Mr. HERGER. We tend not to read that much about some of these other incidents that you're talking about here in the United States which I find ironic. Would you maybe comment a bit, if you would, on what you see as the relationship between the rebel field commanders and the interim Afghan government?

Ambassador TOMSEN. Yes, sir. The Afghan interim government has seven parties in it. Three or four of those parties have significant forces operating inside Afghanistan, tens of thousands.

Others have less, the other members. So there is a direct link to many commanders in the field from the Afghan interim government. The bulk of the commanders in Afghanistan have looser relations with the Afghan interim government or do not have any relations with the Afghan interim government.

There is a trend within the Afghan interim government. They are attempting to establish links with these commanders and to move nonmilitary supplies along those links to create closer relationships, certainly a dialog.

This will take time. We don't know if it will succeed. As you know, there are many divisions in Afghan society and that is reflected in the Afghan interim government. We encourage it to broaden its links, to establish a dialog in relations with more commanders inside and with the minority Shias groups.

We are trying to help it to meet the test, but it remains to be seen whether they can.

Mr. HERGER. Thank you.

Mr. McNULTY. We have been joined by Congresswoman Patterson of South Carolina. At this point, I would recognize Congressman Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I regret that I have to go on to another meeting, but I do have a few questions I'd like to ask. Apparently, our current policy prevents our officials from going in Afghanistan to monitor relief operations.

While security may be an issue in some areas, we are told that some of the mujahideen controlled areas are quite safe. Why aren't we allowed to go into those areas to assist with monitoring or dispersing aid?

Mr. CRANDALL. You're putting me in a difficult position, Congressman. It happens to be a policy that I personally disagree with. The policy does have, I think, a good substance in reality.

At any given point in Afghanistan, warfare can break out even though it may be in area which is under mujahideen control. There is no area in the country which is invulnerable, if you will, to air attack.

If the regime wished to, on a brave day, they could even error into any given area by helicopter, essentially troops. That does happen from time to time. There is also the question of mines in the country.

There are countless thousands, millions of these things scattered about and there is no desire at this point to have any official American such as myself wounded or killed or captured or worse if we should get into a security situation.

Mr. GILMAN. Do we have some relief in those areas?

Mr. CRANDALL. Sir, our humanitarian programs are national in scope. With the exceptions of the cities which the regime controls, we have activities throughout the country. There is no place in the country we cannot and do not reach with our programs.

Mr. GILMAN. Yet, we don't know how effective they are?

Mr. CRANDALL. We do, sir. We have—I mentioned early on and perhaps I was going a bit fast, but we have in excess of 8,000 em-

ployees on A.I.D. rolls who administer these various programs inside the country.

We have an extensive reporting and monitoring system. There are, of course, intelligent sources that are available to us. There are Europeans who travel throughout the country who are not so constrained. They from time to time provide us with reports.

We have independent monitoring systems that monitor our monitors so that we can make sure that these guys are not sitting in tea houses on the Pakistan side making things up.

So we have a fairly extensive network of people travelling throughout the country at all times making sure that things are happening.

Mr. GILMAN. Are the Soviets providing any humanitarian aid?

Mr. CRANDALL. Yes, they are. The Ambassador mentioned that our data indicates that historically they have provided about 300,000 tons of food per year, though a goodly portion of that has gone to feeding the military.

Mr. GILMAN. How does that compare to what we're providing?

Mr. CRANDALL. It's very difficult to monetize these things. Whenever you're dealing with rubles and trying to translate—

Mr. GILMAN. You said in tons, 300,000 tons. What are we providing?

Mr. CRANDALL. We have an equivalent food program that feeds just the countryside this year of Public Law 480 title II(e) of 120,000 metric tons of which we provide 8,000 to 9,000 metric tons per month across border.

We also have food packs. These will feed a family of four for 7 days. We send countless thousands of those inside. We have, of course, assistance to the refugee camps as well on the Pakistan side which is really quite extensive.

Mr. GILMAN. What about our assistance through the mujahideen? Do we have a way of monitoring that?

Mr. CRANDALL. Sir, I am the representative for our programs out there to the resistance on humanitarian programs. The vast majority of what I am talking about is just that, assistance through the mujahideen.

Mr. GILMAN. In your discussions in Peshawar, Mr. Ambassador, did you discuss broad basing the opposition in terms of expending interim government, making one of the partners in an eventual coalition along with the good Muslims? Who are the good Muslims, incidentally?

Ambassador TOMSEN. Good Muslims, that is a term that was coined, I think, to try to create a way where some people in the PDPA regime could come into a government that is truly representative of the Afghan people and not a Soviet puppet.

They could not be given the term which would associate themselves with the PDPA regime. That was done around the time of the Geneva Accords. That term has since fallen out of us. In terms of the broad-based government, this is something that myself, other American officials, Pakistani officials and many others constantly convey to the interim government.

It's for them to decide. We're not like the Soviets. We don't play musical chairs like they have for 8 years in changing the leader-

ship of the PDPA. Actually, every 2 years there's a new leader there. They have to do it themselves.

I met with representatives of the Shias. There's a group of eight. There's also Harakat-Islami, another group, which is more powerful inside Afghanistan in terms of resistance fighting.

I urge them to talk to the AIG in reaching accommodation. I did the same with the AIG. The AIG has set aside six or seven ministries and they're waiting for the Shias, but they haven't reached a compromise. They are still negotiating.

A key part of broadening the base is to establish more links with military Shuras, groups of military commanders, inside Afghanistan who are doing the fighting. As I mentioned, this is a policy of the AIG but we've yet to see whether it will succeed.

Mr. GILMAN. Could you tell us something about the relationship between the rebel field commanders and the leaders of the Afghan interim government? Are the commanders paying any attention to the political leaders?

Ambassador TOMSEN. Yes, inside the AIG we do have a number of party leaders who have direct ties with well over 60,000 fighters inside. There's a lot of others, actually probably 300,000 inside.

So there are blocks of military commanders and military Shuras who are running troops and exercises, operations, against the regime who do not have links with the interim government.

Masood is probably the most well known from the council of the north. He has a large military force under his command. He has issued statements supporting the interim government saying it's necessary to have an alternative to the regime at Kabul for the resistance.

Then he has gone on to criticize it for not being broad-based, for not having consulted others before it was formed and for other reasons. Some commanders have no relations. They just continue the struggle without any communications with the interim government.

Mr. GILMAN. Can you tell us a little bit about what caused the blood shed in the last few days?

Ambassador TOMSEN. Are you talking about the ambush?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes.

Ambassador TOMSEN. We are still waiting for the results of the investigations. The AIG itself is conducting an investigation and has said that whoever is guilty, they will be punished.

It's a very fuzzy situation but it does seem like seven of Masood's commanders from Takhar province were murdered and the following day 23 mujahideen who were associated with them were murdered.

We have told all parties that we deplore this not only for the act itself, the heinous nature of the act itself but because of the divisiveness that it creates within the resistance.

I would add that Afghans tell me when I discuss this that this has happened before and it will happen again. Like, for instance, there's one story out—and I don't know if it's true—that the person accused of perpetrating this, his brother had been killed the previous year by a commander on the other side.

I have no idea whether this is true or not. What needs to be done is to have an investigation. That investigation is underway. I un-

derstand people associated with this incident have been called to Peshawar.

What the interim government does in response to this will be important in terms of their credibility and their effectiveness.

Mr. GILMAN. Is there some hope that a strong central government could come out of all of this or will we go back to the tribal regimes once again in Afghanistan?

Ambassador TOMSEN. I think, Mr. Chairman, that there probably won't be a strong central government in Afghanistan given the social and cultural foundations of the society, the great importance of the tribal culture which you mentioned and the differences ethnically among Pushtoons and Tajiks and many other groups inside of Afghanistan who are well armed and who have always defended their own areas.

Kabul is very important. It is the seat of the Afghan government historically now and in the past and it will be in the future.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McNULTY. Vice Chairman Emerson.

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Crandall, you mentioned food packs. What do they consist of? You say they will sustain a family for 4 days?

Mr. CRANDALL. They will sustain a family of four for 7 days, Congressman.

Mr. EMERSON. Four for 7 days.

Mr. CRANDALL. We had an Islamic nutritional institute in the southern city of Karachi designed for us, the cheapest and yet highest value nutritionally of food pack we could come up using all local ingredients, if you will.

These packages contain ghee, tea, sugar, and pulses of various kinds as well as a package of rice. We have experimented with other things, dry dates and what not, and they do occasionally appear in the diet, if you will, or in these packs. Those are the major ingredients that I mentioned.

Mr. EMERSON. You can't translate that into a metric ton equivalency but it is substantial?

Mr. CRANDALL. Yes, sir, it is. I have not so translated it, but we could do that if you'd like.

Mr. EMERSON. No, I'd be more interested in how many people you're feeding by that means?

Mr. CRANDALL. I can give you a figure. The figure I have, sir, is the food packs we have provided thus far have provided 28 million meals to Afghans. That's obviously a rough figure, but it should serve your purposes.

Mr. EMERSON. That's very good, 28 million meals. You also mentioned a means of supplying food to the mujahideen camps separate and apart from the food packs and in addition to the 150,000 metric tons of grain. How do we go about that?

Mr. CRANDALL. Do you mean the refugee camps?

Mr. EMERSON. Yes, the refugee camps.

Mr. CRANDALL. Well, my program does not do that. My program is exclusively involved with humanitarian activities in resistance controlled areas. The feeding programs in the refugee camps on the Pakistan side of the border, while supported by the U.S. Government in kind, are not managed or ministered by the U.S. Govern-

ment. We are there as monitors, as overseers, if you will, but we do not do the work itself.

Mr. EMERSON. PVO's?

Mr. CRANDALL. The U.N.H.C.R., the United Nations High Commission for Refugees has the primary responsibility for humanitarian activities in refugee camps. They are assisted in a few cases by PVO's and some of those are American.

Mr. EMERSON. What is the U.N. effort in total, both internally in Afghanistan and cross border?

Mr. CRANDALL. I can speak to the cross border and I'll leave it to my colleague, Rich Castrodale, to speak to the other one.

The special coordinator for Afghanistan, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, has by his own accounting raised some \$900 million for assistance to returning refugees. Now that \$900 million contains a \$600 million figure or 400 million rubles Soviet in-kind contribution.

Mr. EMERSON. How much?

Mr. CRANDALL. It's 400 million rubles or \$600 million dollars. So the vast majority of that would be a Soviet contribution. The ruble-dollar exchange rate used is a very serious question here.

Mr. EMERSON. What percentage of the total population in Afghanistan is in need of food and humanitarian assistance?

Mr. CRANDALL. I think you really have to look at the question historically. Afghanistan, prior to the war, prior to 1978, was considered by all comers, if you will, all developers, all economists as one of the poorest, perhaps the poorest country in the world.

So arguably, even at that time, just about everybody in the countryside was in need of some form of assistance. I think it can be argued that today because of the disastrous effects of some 10 years of war, that everybody in the countryside which is controlled by the mujahideen is even more in need.

There are some absolutely appalling health statistics which Congressman McNulty made reference to in his statement. Those are as accurate as we know them to be. They are some of the worst statistics you will find anywhere in the world.

That is why we have put such an emphasis on our health project inside Afghanistan.

Mr. EMERSON. Would you say there is a condition of famine there or is it just a tenuous daily struggle?

Mr. CRANDALL. I would not say it's a condition of famine or even approximating that at this point in time. There has been a history of famine in Afghanistan. In the early 1970's, 1971-72, there was a famine in the northwest that centered on a town called Mimina which resulted in the deaths of 15,000 to 20,000 Afghans and countless numbers of their animals.

We have had no substantiated reports of famine inside Afghanistan since this war began. There have been shortages, critical shortages at times, but our programs and commercial movements and leakages out of the Soviet supplied 300 million have, in aggregate, managed to treat the problem.

Mr. EMERSON. Is there then some measure of self-sufficiency? Do they produce some of their food needs?

Mr. CRANDALL. Yes, sir. The best figures available to us suggest the following. Prior to the war, it took 2.2 to 2.3 million tons of food grains to feed a population of around 15 million people.

You net out 5 million refugees living in Pakistan and Iran and our experts tell us that we now have a food grain production at about 1.3 million metric tons. To that a possible, not proved but possible—to that, of course, you have to add our own food programs then and those of the Soviets.

Mr. EMERSON. I hear the bells have rung and we're going to have to go for a vote. I'm afraid we're going to have a series of votes.

Mr. McNULTY. That may be true.

Mr. EMERSON. I have a number of more questions. I realize you have busy schedules and I wouldn't want to tie you up interminably here but how flexible are you?

Ambassador TOMSEN. I have a 12:15 lunch, Mr. Congressman, so I'm available until then. My colleagues are as well, I think.

Mr. EMERSON. That's what I'm afraid of. I think we've probably got three votes that have been rolled over from last night. Is that correct?

Mr. McNULTY. Well, we have two more beyond this one.

Mr. EMERSON. So we're going to be the better part of an hour.

Mr. McNULTY. The other two are 5-minute votes.

Mr. EMERSON. There's going to be an interim explanation period between the votes. I don't know. We're between a rock and a hard place here.

Mr. McNULTY. Obviously if we have three votes and they're going to be 15 minutes each and you have some time in between, obviously we're not going to be able to get back to the Ambassador. I guess the only other alternative is to submit the questions in writing.

Mr. EMERSON. What about the other two witnesses?

Mr. CRANDALL. Sir, we have, at least I have, agreed to meet some other members of your body at 12 o'clock and I think at 1 o'clock. I'm certainly available up until then.

Mr. EMERSON. I don't really see any alternative but to excuse this panel of witnesses. They do have other things to do. Most of the questions that I have relate to humanitarian issues, some relating to the multilateral arrangements there between the United States and Afghanistan and Pakistan.

I would ask unanimous consent to submit some questions in writing. I regret having to do that because we'll have them for the record, but I think in terms of those who are here today to glean what is going on, you have a lot of fresh information to give us having just returned from that area.

I regret that the schedule of the House is such that we can't pursue this here at this time. Thank you for being here and for what you have given us. I would like to submit some questions in writing.

Mr. McNULTY. Congresswoman Patterson.

Mrs. PATTERSON. I'd also like to submit some questions. Let me say that I did visit the area within Pakistan and up on Peshawar this spring. I had some questions I did want to ask you had we visited the refugee camps. I'm very interested in having an opportunity to talk with you.

Ambassador TOMSEN. Perhaps I could come by sometime and we could meet separately.

Mrs. PATTERSON. That would be wonderful because I am concerned about what I saw and what I learned and what I want to know more about.

Ambassador TOMSEN. OK, thank you.

Mr. McNULTY. I will also be submitting some questions in writing on my own behalf and on the behalf of the chairman, Chairman Leland. I'd like to thank all three of you for appearing this morning, for your testimony.

This hearing will stand adjourned until approximately noon at which time we'll convene the second panel.

[Recess.]

Mr. McNULTY. Could I ask panel No. 2 to please come forward. I'd like to welcome Henry Norman, who is the president of VITA and his associate Mr. Sediq; Dr. Cynthia Haq and Catherine O'Neill of the International Rescue Committee.

I want to apologize to members of the panel and others in attendance for our hectic schedule today. Many of you are familiar with the proceedings of the House and with vote interruptions and so on.

This is a particularly hectic week with the Department of Defense bill. As a matter of fact, we may have to go out again shortly for another vote.

For that reason and since I'm sure that members of the panel all have other things scheduled for today, I consulted with Vice Chairman Emerson and we thought it might be a good idea, if you're comfortable with it, instead of reading your entire statements, if you would wish to summarize them so that we could more quickly get into the question period, I think that would be most helpful to us and also make better use of your time.

So with that, I thank you for appearing before the committee. You may proceed in any manner you wish.

STATEMENT OF HENRY NORMAN, PRESIDENT, VOLUNTEERS IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, VITA, ACCOMPANIED BY MOHAMMAD SEDIQ

Mr. NORMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I am Henry Norman, the president of the Volunteers in Technical Assistance. VITA is a not-for-profit volunteer organization which has worked in international development since 1959.

We administer the largest cross border agricultural program in Afghanistan. It is a program that is funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development. It is a 3-year program which started in 1957. It is funded at \$10.5 million.

My colleague, engineer, Mohammad Sediq, is the chief of party of the program. He is a native Afghan. The important feature of this program is the fact that it is, with the exception of a single American financial administrator, populated completely from top to bottom by Afghans and a few Pakistanis.

The requests from the interior of Afghanistan are generated by Afghans. They are considered by Afghans. They are carried out by Afghans entirely. We are a support element. It is a program that is

not imposed by a foreign group on Afghan; it is a program that belongs to the Afghans. We do our best to assist them.

I was asked to describe what we do. We try to determine specific needs within Afghanistan. We operate in about eight provinces. We send into Afghanistan equipment that is needed, agricultural equipment, improved seed, root stock for fruit trees.

We are now in the process of sending in several tons of wheat seed and also 9,000 tons of fertilizer. This is a logistic effort of some magnitude in a country that is in the middle of a war from a neighboring country.

It's a tribute to Mr. Sediq and his colleagues that they are able to handle this kind of a logistic effort. He is assisted by Dr. Abdul Wakil who is the former minister of agriculture.

Let me skip to the question of the recommendations that we would make if given the opportunity. We feel that the need in Afghanistan is enormous. It's just barely scratching the surface to do what we are doing.

We feel that expanding the program is essential. Although the program is almost exclusively an Afghan program and the Agency for International Development has been very supportive in our acceleration of the activities, we feel a quantum leap in the projects is now called for.

We would see the possibility of an increase of three to four times the present budget to speed up assistance to farmers in building an Afghanistan agricultural infrastructure. Mr. Sediq and his colleagues have successfully implemented larger programs in Afghanistan and elsewhere and we feel that it's called for.

We recommend a stepped up training program to ensure the availability of managers and technicians to implement the vastly increased effort by international donors to meet food production requirements to feed returning refugees when the struggle ends.

We recommend multiyear funding for the program so that the need for improved seed, insecticides, fertilizer, equipment, and animals can be addressed in a more orderly, efficient and economical way than it can be at present.

Finally, we recommend a major increase in the availability of broadcast time on the Voice of America where we have broadcast 34 programs on agriculture into Afghanistan at critical times in the planting and harvest cycle. We feel that more of this is needed.

These are just a few of our recommendations. Again, we would like to commend the U.S. Agency for International Development and the cooperation that we have enjoyed with them and the support of the Congress for the program in Afghanistan.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Norman appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 93.]

Mr. McNULTY. Dr. Haq, before you begin, I just wanted to announce we've been joined by Congressman Dorgan and he has submitted a statement for the record. Without objection, that will be included as part of the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dorgan appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 38.]

STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA HAQ, M.D., REPRESENTATIVE, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, WOMEN'S COMMISSION FOR REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN, ACCOMPANIED BY CATHERINE O'NEILL

Dr. HAQ. I would like to thank you for this opportunity to address this committee as a private citizen and as a representative of the Women's Commission of the International Rescue Committee.

The Women's Commission was formed in January of this year to look at the specific needs of women and children refugees throughout the world. In March, I travelled to Peshawar, Pakistan to look at the status of Afghan refugee women and children.

I met with refugees in the camps, with doctors, teachers, politicians, and leaders of many of the PVO's as well as the U.N.H.C.R. There currently exists a situation of extreme uncertainty since the Soviet withdrawal.

There's no clear control or clear unification of leadership that I was able to feel from within the camps. Fighting has escalated and refugees are increasing into Pakistan at a rate of almost 1,000 per day.

The time until peace is unknown. There's great ambiguity in the PVO situation as to whether to focus efforts on rapid rehabilitation programs or for much longer stays in Pakistan.

The Pakistani Government has also been severely strained with the burden of providing essential services for 5 million refugees, the largest population of refugees in the world.

Despite these crises, and the 10-year war, the status of Afghan refugees is a real tribute to the international community. The United States has been respected as a leader in provision of humanitarian relief.

Most of the refugees have access to food, water, and basic health care; yet there is great variability in the provision of these services. There are many holes and gaps in coverage for particular groups and individuals.

Let us turn to the status and needs of women and children, the silent and vulnerable who have almost no opportunity to speak for themselves in this situation. As has been said, Afghanistan was one of the poorest nations with the highest infant, child and maternal mortality rate prior to the war.

There has been some modest improvement in these mortality statistics within the refugee camps; again, a real tribute to the international cooperative efforts. Women are primarily illiterate, 95 percent, and most were from rural areas of Afghanistan but had very important and vital roles in maintaining the family structure and in agricultural production.

Life in the refugee camps has been extremely oppressive for women. I'll say that this is one of the most oppressive situations of any group of people I've seen in the world.

Most are confined to their huts and tents with very little opportunity to move about, to have any voice in their future or even to know of the situation going on outside their camps.

Afghan refugee women have the highest birth rate of any group in the world. One in four women of childbearing age is currently

pregnant. At this rate, the Afghan refugee women will have an average of 13 or 14 children apiece.

The children are also severely stressed. Their situation is dependent on the well-being of their mothers and parents. A generation is being raised in these refugee camps without access to schooling or even play or the normal activities they'll need to be important members of their society.

Less than one-half are immunized and there are still many thousands of preventable deaths. There are some even more needy, widows, orphans, handicapped, estimated at almost 1 million but we don't have precise figures on the numbers of these very needy and vulnerable.

In many cases, extended families are caring for these vulnerable, but now the ability of families to cope with these great needs are being exceeded. How can the U.S. Government best respond to the crisis?

The levels of funding assistance must be maintained and optimally should be increased. As the war continues, there are more refugees, increased devastation, and greater needs for humanitarian assistance.

There needs to be a shift in focus of funding assistance toward the special needs of women and children. Despite the best intentions, these needs have often been overlooked.

Female representation should be sought in the Afghan interim government. There should be a system of accountability of looking at the needs of women and children within the government that we are recognizing.

If this government is representative of the majority of the people, where are the women's voices? How are they being heard?

Women and children training programs need to be developed now. Women need to be able to contribute to the rehabilitation efforts of their country. The women are willing and ready. We need to attach funding and priorities to training programs for developing these vital human resources.

Full levels of funding assistance should be provided to the U.N.H.C.R. who oversee the coordinating of refugee assistance and to Sadruddin Aga Khan who is the coordinator of repatriation programs.

Funding should be provided to the Aga Khan now because once repatriation occurs, it's too late. This will be one of the biggest repatriation programs in history. Planning, funding, and thought needs to be put into that at this time.

We had the opportunity to meet with Sadruddin Aga Khan in April of this year. He expressed great thought and sensitivity to the special needs of women and children and repatriation efforts.

We need to maintain some flexible moneys for assistance programs to avert crisis that are occurring on a regular basis given the unpredictability and ambiguity in the current situation.

Provision of primary health care services, food, water, commodities, immunization efforts, and training of primary health care workers should be maintained and increased. Primary health care workers who are being trained now will be the primary providers of health care in Afghanistan after the war. They should be trained accordingly.

We should focus on the development of human resources of all Afghans while we have the golden opportunity while they are in the refugee camps concentrated to give them the skills they'll need to rebuild their homeland.

Some special effort should be placed in identifying the vulnerable groups, those who are most at risk and most in need of humanitarian assistance, the widows and handicapped. We still don't know their numbers, their locations, their needs. This should be a true humanitarian priority.

Finally, continuation of the war will only increase the number of refugees, the devastation, the widows and the needs. Every effort to negotiate a political settlement and to bring a rapid return to peace should be made.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Haq appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 112.]

Mr. McNULTY. Thank you very much.

Ms. O'Neill, do you have an opening statement?

**STATEMENT OF CATHERINE O'NEILL, CHAIR, WOMEN'S
COMMISSION FOR REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN**

Ms. O'NEILL. My name is Catherine O'Neill. I am the Chair of the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children. I have spent time in the refugee camps in Pakistan on two separate occasions.

In 1983, I spent 3 months in that part of the world doing study for my Ph.D. in international relations. I was back there last year as a representative or member of the Citizens Commission for Afghanistan and spent a week in Peshawar, Pakistan.

During that time, I asked to visit with all of the programs involved in support of women refugees. I regret to tell the members of this panel that one can do that in a half a day.

Despite the hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars the United States and other countries—the United States particularly—has spent in support of Afghan refugees, we have been, I am afraid, remiss in seeing that the money has been equitably spent.

Let me be specific. There is one high school in Pakistan for Afghan girls. It was started by a principal in Kabul who had to go door to door asking for funds. The funds came from a private agency. She had to open her school at the risk of death threats on herself and students.

I visited the one OB-GYN clinic for Afghan women. Women and their children represent 75 percent of the 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Yet, that one OB-GYN clinic also struggles and struggles for funds, hangs on by its fingertips, has a staff of Afghan doctors and has not been a high priority for U.S. humanitarian funding.

I visited a lady health visitor program which trained lady health visitors to do training of health awareness programs inside Afghanistan. That Afghan doctor, too, also told me that he had to struggle and struggle for funds.

When we need—I would recommend to you is an independent congressional assessment of how humanitarian funds have been al-

located. Surely the intention of Congress with this enormous generosity in allocating humanitarian funds for the Afghan refugees has been to see that the funds be equitably dispersed among the men and women populations.

Let me be a little bit more specific. Last night I was reading a report of one of the larger international agencies on education programs. Their report for 1988 indicated that they had 14,100 boys in school and 200 girls.

The Women's Commission has just received a grant from the National Endowment for Democracy to start the first social service center for Afghan women in Peshawar. This is 10 years after refugees started to arrive.

We have been told that death threats make it very difficult for any voluntary agency to have any of their workers associated with the starting of a women's center. I also have been told that the Afghan principal of the one girls high school has been finally, after staying in Pakistan with her nine children for 10 years, driven out of the country and had to ask for a resettlement in Australia because she too has received death threats.

It seems as though it's incumbent on the Congress, given all of the publicity we have seen in the last several weeks about the internecine struggle going on in Pakistan now, given the fact that the United States is the only country at present who is still funding humanitarian aid exclusively through the rebel alliance of Pakistan, and given the fact that we are not generously responding to Prince Sadrudin's United Nations call as Japan has and as some of the other European governments are, it seems as though since we are spending so much money with such good congressional intention that the Congress should ask for a congressional audit of how that money is being spent.

That would be my request to you today.

[Additional questions for Ms. O'Neill appear on p. 126.]

Mr. McNULTY. Does Mr. Sediq have a statement?

Mr. SEDIQ. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for discussing the issue of Afghanistan today. On behalf of our other friends and colleagues, I take this opportunity to thank you so much and hope that Afghanistan will be free and independent and in the future we will be again a democratic society. Thank you so much.

Mr. McNULTY. Thank you, Mr. Sediq. Dr. Haq and Ms. O'Neil, you concentrated on the plight of women in Afghanistan and the refugees, as I did in my opening statement. One of the questions I was going to ask Mr. Crandall before we were interrupted by the last series of votes was about the A.I.D. program of income generation for women.

Are you aware of that program? Do you know how that is working? We're going to submit a question in writing to Mr. Crandall about that. Are you familiar with that program at all?

Ms. O'NEILL. I think a lot of Mr. Crandall's operations are cross border programs. So unless one is inside Afghanistan, it's difficult to answer.

Mr. McNULTY. OK. Mr. Norman, could you be a little bit more specific on how you organize your projects specifically? How do you identify the local leaders, work with local commanders and target specific groups?

What criteria did you use to choose the 14 specific provinces that you're working in?

Mr. NORMAN. Let me, if I may, Mr. Chairman, begin the answer and then turn it over to my colleague. Like most volunteer organizations, VITA goes to some length to try to do things from the bottom up rather than the top down.

Our effort in Afghanistan follows that tradition and that discipline. With that, I'd like to turn it over to my colleague to talk about the Shuras which are the local councils that we are working with.

Mr. SEDIQ. Thank you very much. The request from the villages of Afghanistan are received through the Shuras. The Shuras are the council that we have found at the local district level.

There are about 218 subdistricts in Afghanistan. We started in 1987 in the areas that security was allowing our people to go and work. In 1987, the situation of security was not as good as we have security today.

We started with limited areas on an experimental basis. The request comes to us from the committee—Shuras—and the local committee which prioritizes the projects.

The criteria that we use is to have all the community concerns in that particular area to work together. We do expect the local communities on voluntary basis also come with some local contribution.

Although it is very difficult in a situation like the war in Jihad to ask for local contribution, but we have maintained a criteria to have local contributions from the villages that we work with.

The provinces that they were liberated before and they are gathering to Pakistan one of the areas we were able to work and move in. So we are working in 10 provinces that absolutely they are under the mujahideen control.

The government, as it was mentioned this morning by Ambassador Tomsen, the government can attack any part of Afghanistan even sometimes they are attacking parts of Pakistan. The area that we work, we do have physical offices inside Afghanistan.

Hundred percent there are under the mujahideen control. The requests are received through the—before they interim government must form and now those members of the committee, they are also directly responding to us in our member of our organization.

They are part of the employees of the interim government. They are representing the interim government in our office. Thank you so much.

Mr. McNULTY. Mr. Emerson of Missouri.

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask Dr. Haq and Ms. O'Neill, this is very troubling what you say about the inequitable attention given to women and children. We know that Afghanistan is traditionally one of the most conservative, tradition-minded countries in the world. How much of that problem is related to tradition and religion and how much of it is outright discrimination?

Dr. HAQ. I would say that in response to that, Islam fundamentally is a religion that gives rights and increased privileges to women. Islam is very advocating of education for women and of an equal status in society.

There are currently some very fundamentalist groups that are shaping the opinion in policy toward women in the refugee camps.

Mr. EMERSON. Could you identify them?

Dr. HAQ. All I can say is some of the fundamentalists religious sects seem to be in control. The refugees with whom I met said they feel very intimidated by these groups, but they really were powerless to speak out against them.

These are the groups that we're giving funding and support to. These are groups that are being repressive to women, basically disallowing women to attend any training programs, et cetera.

Mr. EMERSON. Are these groups indigenous to Afghanistan or is there a foreign influence?

Dr. HAQ. I can't answer that fully. I know that some of these are representatives of the seven party alliance that tend to be more fundamentalist. I don't know the extent of the outside influence, but I do know that some of the feelings that are being perpetrated on the entire refugee group are not feelings that are representative of Afghan society as a whole; they are representative of these very fundamentalist and conservative religious groups.

They're making programs for women very difficult. I think we really need to ask some accountability to the groups we're supporting to see if they really are addressing the needs of the majority, if they're representing the majority of their population.

It's striking to me that women are completely absent from the interim government. There is no mechanism for them to have a voice.

Mr. EMERSON. Would anyone else care to comment?

Ms. O'NEILL. I would just add that Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan met with the Women's Commission and discussed in depth with us the very complex, complicated social fabric of what had been prerevolutionary Afghanistan.

He did say that within that very complex web of the way in which Islam was practiced in that country with tribal religious ethnic, historical village differences, that fundamentalism had played a role.

He compared it for us to the same way that some of the fundamentalists religious leaders in the United States played a role; that they represent a segment of thinking and that they do have people who truly follow that segment of thinking.

It did not reflect the nature of the entire society of Afghanistan. He went on to tell us that he thought that in fact the way in which the Afghan interim government, the seven party alliance had treated women, was an actual detriment to the way in which they were being perceived in Afghanistan because people were at that time terrified at the way in which their policies might be imposed on a whole country.

I will just say that I visited with the Afghan doctor who had stayed behind, who was not immigrated, who was running that OB-GYN hospital for women in Peshawar. While I talked to him, he had a big picture over his desk of his daughter who is 3, the same age as my daughter.

He said to me the country that I'm bringing my daughter back to is a place where she will be allowed to be educated. If that is not the case and if the fundamentalists are the ones who impose their

belief in my country, I will be the first to seek asylum even though I have sat here for 10 years praying to go back. We really have to hear the pleas of those people.

Mr. EMERSON. Anyone else care to comment?

Mr. SEDIQ. Thank you very much for giving me the chance to talk again. This, unfortunately, the second half of the—more than half of the population of Afghanistan was a problem for the government in the past.

In 1921, the government—from 1921 to 1928—one of the governments, they started education in Afghanistan. That was overturned unfortunately by the people—some interference from some way, some part.

So I hope that the intergovernment people will be—at the moment, they don't have any policy for any area. The government is new. I do hope that they will address this issue to the possible extend indirectly.

As an Afghan, I personally was involved. We have been talking to the leaders not to forget the important part of society because they were directly involved in the Jihad also. The women of Afghanistan, they were supporting the mujahideen providing food for them, providing shelter.

I hope that they in some source will be responsible and act urgently on this issue because time is—a lot of Afghan children, men and women and children, boys and girls, they are out of school for the moment.

Mr. EMERSON. I guess one fundamental point I want to get at is that the religious fundamentalists are in charge and are imposing this structure. It is not an inherent tenet of the religion.

Dr. HAQ. That's correct.

Mr. EMERSON. The women must be subjugated and that they acquiesce in that. Sometimes I think we get in trouble when we try to interfere with cultures that we don't understand very well. There are a lot of instances, I think, in history where we've tried to reform people to be more like us when in fact they really don't want to be like us. I think we've got to be sensitive to that.

Ms. O'NEILL. We also have to be sensitive to the fact that the host country has a prime minister with an Oxford education who is the first woman to be the president of the Oxford debating unit and who is a good Muslim prime minister.

Dr. HAQ. I think we should also think about the fact of whether or not the women want this. Do the women of Afghanistan want this government? Do they want this kind of control and subjugation?

Has anyone asked them? Do they have the opportunity to speak or have any role in what their future will hold?

Mr. EMERSON. This must be sorted out. It's going to be a sensitive job. There are so many political complications that we have to wade through there before we can begin probably to understand the cultural complications. It's a sensitive problem.

I would agree with you, I think, that we need to have some sort of an independent audit made, some objective assessment of how we might wade through this. That could be the concern of this committee. We don't have legislative jurisdiction. We have some persuasive ability at times in working with different agencies of the

government. I think we need to explore what options may be available here by which we can sensitively bring some pressure to bear to see that all of the people for whom the humanitarian aid is intended are indeed the beneficiaries of it.

I'm also shocked at the low level of immunization there. Why is that? Why hasn't a greater effort been made?

Dr. HAQ. I think there have been efforts but they have been variable from one camp to another. There does seem to be a great deal of variability. When I speak of the low level of immunization, I'm talking about full level of immunization.

Some children have received a few immunizations but the majority have not been completely immunized. There's also been the problem of more refugees arriving. There's also been the problem of refugees not being allowed to register officially and be counted at times.

So the provision of services for these groups are quite variable.

Mr. EMERSON. Are there teams of paramedics? How are immunizations carried out?

Dr. HAQ. The camps each have their own sort of independent health services provided. Some are quite methodical and others are basically set up on the edge of camp and wait for people to come.

So there's no uniformity of the way the services are being provided. These are the best estimates that I could find. They are probably not precise figures but the best I could come up with when I was there.

Mr. EMERSON. How, in a general way, do western A.I.D. workers interact with the Afghan people? What problems have you found and how have you resolved them? Anyone may address this. Is there stand-offishness or is there good rapport?

Ms. O'NEILL. Of course, one of the issues is the language barrier in that many of the refugees speak either Pushtu or Dari. Many foreign aid workers are not fluent in that language.

So it is very difficult at times to have a rapport with someone you're working with that you can't communicate with. When I was there I visited with Medicins San Frontiere, Save the Children-U.K., Swedish Committee and a number of other leading voluntary agencies from other nations as well as with the American A.I.D. agencies.

One of the things that I was really surprised at was the fact that—I read through my notes this morning before coming over here—was that so many of the different agencies—San Frontiere, Save the Children-U.K., and the Swedish Committee all insisted that they worked directly with commanders inside.

They told me that the commanders inside really resented having to go through this Pakistan based group to get money. They said that they felt the commanders were really the ones who had stayed, whose families had risked life and limb and who had actually fought.

They really resisted having this other group imposed on them where they had to kind of go crawling for help. So their governments were supporting them in dealing directly with Afghan commanders inside Afghanistan.

Mr. EMERSON. Anyone else care to comment?

Mr. NORMAN. I had the pleasure of serving as the advisor, the management advisor to the minister of public health of Afghanistan for 2 years. So I was familiar with Afghan culture and was quite comfortable with Afghans themselves.

Mr. EMERSON. When was that?

Mr. NORMAN. This was in 1976-78. When we were asked to undertake the program, we were extremely careful about the type of people, both Afghans and expatriates that we recruited for the program.

We made the decision very early in the game that we would bring on very senior Afghans and that we would give them programmatic, substantive programmatic responsibility with the view to their running the entire program as early as possible.

We chose carefully and I am convinced we chose well. As I indicated before, the entire program is in the hands of Afghans with the single exception of a financial administrator. We had the good fortune in that there were a great many expatriates who had worked with Afghans over the years.

I think, if I could just turn your question around, that rather than expatriates being comfortable working with Afghans, Afghans are comfortable working with expatriates. They are extremely sophisticated.

Mr. Sediq worked in several other countries with A.I.D. and with other American PVO's so that the Afghans themselves, in our experience, choose the way we have chosen. They are quite comfortable with us and we certainly are with them.

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you. I see once again the bells have rung. At least we have gotten through all of your testimony this time without having to interrupt.

Ms. O'NEILL. May I just say, we are enormously grateful for your interest in this issue. When Ms. Lionetti called, I was just jubilant that there was a committee in Congress who had an interest in pursuing the impact of humanitarian programs.

I know I speak for Dr. Haq and I'm sure all four of us in thanking you very much for putting some time and energy to focus on this issue.

Mr. EMERSON. In an international sense, if I may, Mr. Chairman, that's really what this committee is about. We can't avoid diplomatic and political questions, but our basis concern is humanitarian.

We want to continue to work with you. We could take the discussion here a lot farther this afternoon. What I would encourage you to do is to maintain liaison with our staff. We can move the issues that you have raised forward through a variety of channels.

Ms. O'NEILL. Thank you very much.

Mr. McNULTY. Thank the vice chairman. We thank you very much for your testimony. We are not going to ask you to wait here until we go over to vote and come back because we understand that the next debate is only 20 minutes. We'd no sooner get back here and we'd have to leave you again.

So we thank you for your testimony. We're glad we got some of the questions in. There are some further questions we'd like to submit to you in writing. I know the chairman has some, Mickey Leland.

So we'd like to get those to you and have you respond to them as well. Again, thank you for coming. We certainly appreciate your good work.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:55, the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

**PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. McNULTY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK**

I welcome you to today's hearing on U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan. Ten years of war in Afghanistan have resulted in 2 million displaced persons within the country and 7 million refugees having fled to Iran and Pakistan. This upheaval shows no signs of abatement. Between March and April of this year, 25 thousand new refugees arrived in Pakistan alone.

In response, the U.S. Government has spent over \$761.5 million for Afghan relief since 1979. \$600 million of this support has been for the refugee camps in Pakistan; the rest has been for

cross-border operations run by private voluntary organizations.

This fiscal year, the U.S. has allocated \$95 million for cross-border humanitarian programs, and \$55 million for the United Nations' High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), largely for food aid.

When the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan last February, in accordance with the Geneva Accords, many assumed that the Kabul government would fall immediately, and millions of Afghan refugees would pour out of Pakistan to return home. However, today, five months after the withdrawal of the last Soviet armed forces civil conflict continues between supporters of the Kabul government and the mujaheddin forces who oppose the government. Moreover, the Kabul government remains intact, and it is the interim government, formed by the seven-party alliance of the mujaheddin and supported by both the U.S. and Pakistan, that seems to be weakened. In addition, the military victory which the mujaheddin had hoped for does not seem imminent.

Whether through political settlement or military victory, however, there must be peace and stability in Afghanistan before its 9 million displaced persons and refugees will return to their homes and begin rehabilitation and reconstruction of the nation. This in turn raises a new set of issues. Afghanistan has historically been one of the poorest nations in the world. Before the war, its economy was 80% agriculture-based. Since the war, its agriculture infrastructure has been almost totally destroyed. The country has little medical infrastructure, its sanitation facilities and water sources are inadequate, between 12 and 20 thousand villages have been destroyed or abandoned, and there are mines and explosives deployed through-out the country which pose a threat to the safety of the people.

The cost of reconstruction will be high. Roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, and villages must all be rebuilt, and the country's agriculture infrastructure must be re-developed. Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the UN Coordinator for Humanitarian and Economic

Assistance to Afghanistan, has estimated the cost of repatriation of 3 million refugees to be \$325.53 million. Some experts have suggested that the first four years of reconstruction will cost over \$1.5 billion. So far, the USSR has pledged \$600 million to the UN program, and Japan has pledged \$60 million. The United States has donated only \$17 million; most of U.S. cross-border humanitarian assistance has been channeled through the alliance in Pakistan. Many development experts have suggested that the U.S. should instead strongly support the UN efforts, to make aid truly international and neutral.

In either case, as the U.S. and the UN make plans for resettlement and reconstruction in Afghanistan, the impact on the women and children must be given the highest priority. Women and children make up 75% of the refugee camps' populations. In 1985, Afghanistan had the highest infant mortality rate (173/1000), the highest under-5 mortality rate (304/1000) and one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world. The illiteracy rate for women presently is 95%. These figures may be considered in the

context of both cultural and religious limits imposed on Afghan women. Experience in other developing countries has shown that women play a crucial role in development. Any reconstruction effort in Afghanistan must have the full participation of women if the effort is to be successful. As a result, U.S. investment in Afghan development must include access for women to basic education, health care and economic opportunities.

In summary, today's hearing will address these key questions:

What is the most expedient way to achieve peace in Afghanistan?

What is the U.S. role presently in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan? When will the U.S. join the UN reconstruction program as a full partner? How can we assure that women and children will be given priority consideration in U.S. assistance programs for Afghanistan?

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan last February did not bring the Afghan conflict to an end as was expected. The severity of the conflict has actually intensified as Afghans fight Afghans to win control of their country. The Afghan seven party alliance forces, supported by the U.S. and Pakistan, seem to have lost the cohesion they showed during their fight against the Soviet occupation. Neither a military victory nor a political solution seem attainable in the near future. As a result, the situation for Afghanistan's civilian population remains grim.

Over 3 million refugees remain in camps in Pakistan and although the refugees are reported to live in bearable conditions, the camps have had a destructive effect on the morale and traditional social patterns of the Afghans living there, especially the women.

To assist the Afghan people, the U.S. government has provided substantial humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan over the past decade. One aspect of our assistance has been food aid. In fiscal year 1989, development assistance and economic assistance were estimated at \$75 million. Food aid was valued at \$32.6 million, one third of the estimated total of U.S. assistance. Food aid to Afghanistan has been provided under the P.L. 480 Title II food donation program. However, most of U.S. food aid has been provided as emergency relief rather than as part of the regular programming of Title II commodities. 123,000 metric tons of wheat will be delivered thru cross-border projects by the end of the fiscal year. We must now inquire as to how we can make this substantial emergency aid part of a reconstruction and development effort.

I look forward to hearing the testimony from our witnesses and the discussion to follow on how we can best assist the people of Afghanistan.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BILL EMERSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF MISSOURI

I would like to welcome our witnesses to today's hearing on the humanitarian dimension of the conflict in Afghanistan. The suffering in that country over the past ten has been one of the great tragedies in last half of the 20th century. Millions have been killed, and millions more have become refugees.

In addition to the human cost, the war in Afghanistan has destroyed the economy of the country. Farms have been abandoned or systematically destroyed. Towns and villages have been bombed into rubble. Millions of mines have been left behind that will risk lives and hinder reconstruction for years to come.

Last year the Select Committee on Hunger held its first hearing on Afghanistan. A great deal has happened since then. The Soviet Union has withdrawn its troops. The Afghan resistance forces have extended their control over the country. The Afghan people have also made some progress toward the formation of a free Afghan government.

At the same time, much that was hoped for has not happened. Despite the optimistic predictions of last winter, the Kabul regime has not fallen. The much publicized United Nations relief operation has been essentially non-existent. Refugees have not begun to return home in significant numbers; indeed, recent fighting has forced even more Afghans to leave their homes in

search of sanctuary.

In light of all these issues, it is entirely appropriate that this Committee examine current U.S. policy in Afghanistan. The United States can be proud of the role that it has played in supporting the Afghan people's fight for freedom. In addition to our military aid, we have established a multi-million dollar cross-border humanitarian assistance program that helps the Afghan people during this difficult time. I will be interested to learn more about this program and how it is helping the Afghan people.

At the same time, the United States is continuing its efforts to support the legitimate aspirations of the Afghan people for a free and independent government. I think we all recognize that improvement in the humanitarian situation depends on a resolution of the military and political conflict that has wrecked Afghanistan. I will be especially interested in hearing what our witnesses have to say about the prospects for an end to the fighting and the establishment of an independent and representative Afghan government.

We are fortunate today to have as two of our witnesses individuals who are uniquely qualified to testify about the situation inside Afghanistan. Peter Thomsen was recently confirmed as special envoy to the Afghan resistance and has just returned from the region. He will be making his first Congressional testimony in his new position. Larry Crandall is

the mission director for Afghanistan operations. As such he has responsibility for the administration of the cross-border humanitarian program. Nobody is better qualified to address the humanitarian issues facing the Afghan people.

I would like to welcome all of you, and I look forward to your testimony.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR PETER TOMSEN, SPECIAL ENVOY, AFGHAN
RESISTANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MR. CHAIRMAN:

MY COLLEAGUES AND I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE YOUR COMMITTEE TO REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, U.S. BILATERAL AND UN MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, AND U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN. I WOULD BE PLEASED TO DISCUSS MY RECENT THREE-WEEK VISIT TO PAKISTAN, DURING WHICH, AS U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE, I MET HUNDREDS OF AFGHANS, INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY. MANY TRAVELED TO THE THREE PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER POINTS I VISITED TO PROVIDE THEIR PERSONAL VIEWS TO ME FIRSTHAND.

MY CONVERSATIONS WITH AFGHANS IN THE PAST THREE WEEKS AT TIMES REFLECTED THEIR TRADITIONAL DIFFERENCES ALONG TRIBAL, REGIONAL, ETHNIC AND OTHER LINES. SUCH DIVISIONS IN AFGHAN SOCIETY ARE FAMILIAR TO MANY AMERICANS WHO HAVE READ POPULAR NOVELS, HISTORY AND LITERATURE ABOUT AFGHANISTAN. YET, THERE WAS ONE COMMON OBJECTIVE SHARED BY ALL AFGHANS WHOM I MET: THEIR BITTER OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIET-IMPOSED REGIME IN KABUL, LED BY NAJIB AND THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN, THE PDPA.

SINCE THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE FORCED THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES, MOSCOW HAS BEEN PUMPING UNPRECEDENTED AMOUNTS OF MILITARY HARDWARE INTO AFGHANISTAN TO KEEP NAJIB AND HIS REGIME IN POWER. THE SOVIETS HAVE CREATED A VIRTUAL AIRBRIDGE TO KABUL. THEY HAVE TRANSFERRED OVER 600 APCs AND TANKS, HUNDREDS OF SCUD SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, EACH WITH 2000 POUND WARHEADS, AND THOUSANDS OF TONS OF ARTILLERY, AIRCRAFT ORDNANCE, PLUS OTHER WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS. THESE SUPPLIES DWARF THE ASSISTANCE GOING TO THE RESISTANCE.

THE PDPA REGIME HAS ABANDONED THE MOUNTAINS AND MOST OF AFGHANISTAN'S VALLEYS, BASICALLY FORTIFYING THEMSELVES IN MAJOR TOWNS AND CITIES. WITH THE DEPARTURE OF THE SOVIET FORCES, THE RESISTANCE HAS HAD TO ADJUST TO A MORE CONVENTIONAL KIND OF WARFARE.

AFTER THE INITIAL WEEKS, THE RESISTANCE HAS AVOIDED FRONTAL ASSAULTS ON FORTIFIED POSITIONS. INSTEAD, IT IS SURROUNDING THEM, ATTEMPTING TO CUT OFF CONNECTING ROADS AND AIRFIELDS, AND TO NEGOTIATE THE SURRENDER OF GARRISONS. SINCE FEBRUARY, THE RESISTANCE HAS MADE SLOW, INCREMENTAL PROGRESS IN THIS STRATEGY, BUT TO DATE HAS SCORED NO SINGLE DRAMATIC SUCCESS.

MR. CHAIRMAN, TIME IS ON THE RESISTANCE'S SIDE. IT WILL PREVAIL. THE AFGHAN PEOPLE REJECT NAJIB AND THE PDPA AS A REGIME IMPOSED BY AFGHANISTAN'S POWERFUL NORTHERN NEIGHBOR. THE PDPA REGIME WILL EVENTUALLY MEET THE SAME FATE AS MANY OTHER AFGHANS PLACED IN POWER BY OUTSIDERS OVER THE CENTURIES.

THE WAR HAS SERIOUSLY DISRUPTED THE AFGHAN ECONOMY. RECENT UN ANALYSIS SUGGESTS THAT PRODUCTION OF WHEAT, AFGHANISTAN'S MOST IMPORTANT CROP, MAY BE LESS THAN HALF OF PRE-WAR LEVELS. IRRIGATION SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN SEVERELY DAMAGED. MINES HAVE MADE AGRICULTURAL LAND UNUSABLE, VILLAGES UNSAFE, AND TRANSPORT DIFFICULT. LIVESTOCK HAS BEEN DECIMATED, AND SUPPLIES OF SEED AND FERTILIZER SERIOUSLY REDUCED. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS HAVE FALLEN 40 PERCENT SINCE 1977, AND MOST OF THE TRADITIONAL TRADE TIES THROUGH PAKISTAN BROKEN OR IMPAIRED. IN THE RURAL AREAS, SOCIAL SERVICES WERE HISTORICALLY MINIMAL, BUT HAVE NOW BEEN VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED EXCEPT WHERE SUPPORTED BY INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS.

SINCE 1985 THE U.S., THROUGH A.I.D., HAS BEEN PROVIDING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANS INSIDE AFGHANISTAN. IN THE FALL OF 1988, THE A.I.D. STRATEGY WAS REVISED FROM PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO ALL LIBERATED AREAS OF AFGHANISTAN. IT NOW EMPHASIZES AREAS TO WHICH THE MAJORITY OF THE REFUGEES ARE EXPECTED TO RETURN.

- 4 -

WE EXPECT THE UN AND THE WORLD BANK TO TAKE THE LEAD IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AFGHANISTAN. A TASK THAT REQUIRES GREATER RESOURCES THAN DONORS CAN SUPPLY BILATERALLY. THE OBJECTIVES OF A.I.D.'S PROGRAM THROUGH 1991 ARE TO MEET THE PRESSING NEEDS OF REPATRIATION AND REHABILITATION. THE PRIORITY IS ENSURING FOOD SECURITY AND RESTORING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS, WE WILL SUPPORT PROJECTS TO CLEAR MINES, IMPROVE TRANSPORTATION CAPACITY, SUPPLY FERTILIZER AND SEED, AND PROVIDE ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES. A KEY ELEMENT OF OUR STRATEGY IS AND WILL REMAIN TO REDUCE NARCOTICS PRODUCTION.

AS WE WORK TOWARD REPATRIATION, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST STILL PROVIDE ADEQUATE RESOURCES FOR THE CARE AND MAINTENANCE OF THE REFUGEES IN PLACE. A TOTAL OF 3.2 MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES LIVE IN APPROXIMATELY 230 CAMPS IN PAKISTAN. CONTRARY TO WHAT WE HAD ALL HOPED, THEY HAVE NOT YET GONE HOME. INDEED, AN ADDITIONAL 70,000 REFUGEES HAVE FLED TO PAKISTAN IN RECENT MONTHS, PRIMARILY TO ESCAPE FIGHTING AROUND JALALABAD. IN THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR, THE U.S. IS CONTRIBUTING \$20.5 MILLION FOR CARE AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS, \$5 MILLION FOR ICRC'S EMERGENCY MEDICAL PROGRAM AND \$2.5 MILLION FOR THE UN TRUST FUND. WE HAVE ALSO DONATED \$35 MILLION IN FOOD ASSISTANCE FOR AFGHANS TO THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM.

THE UNITED NATIONS HAS DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB OF MOBILIZING RESOURCES FOR THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN PAKISTAN. HOWEVER, MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE ON BUILDING THE CAPACITY TO SUPPORT THE EVENTUAL REPATRIATION OF THE REFUGEES. THE UN COORDINATOR FOR AFGHANISTAN MOBILIZED CONTRIBUTIONS OF NEARLY \$900 MILLION FROM 30 DONOR COUNTRIES IN FY-89. ALTHOUGH THIS FIGURE IS EXAGGERATED BY VALUING THE \$600 MILLION IN-KIND SOVIET PLEDGE AT THE OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE. WE ARE WORKING WITH THE UN SYSTEM ON THE GROUND IN PAKISTAN TO HELP THE UN GET READY TO USE THESE RESOURCES FOR REPATRIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION.

REGARDING THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES, I REGRET TO INFORM THAT MY PERSONAL CONVERSATIONS WITH REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN PRODUCED THE UNIFORM ANSWER: THE GREAT BULK WILL NOT RETURN UNTIL THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN KABUL IS GONE. TO DATE, ONLY A VERY SMALL PERCENTAGE HAVE RETURNED; OTHERS HAVE ARRIVED FROM AREAS OF CONTINUING CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN TO REPLACE THEM. MY OWN JUDGMENT IS THAT THE GREAT BULK OF THE REFUGEES WILL RETURN ONLY WHEN THE PDPA RELINQUISHES POWER, THROUGH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OR OTHERWISE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, YOU HAVE ASKED THAT I DESCRIBE U.S. POLICY. THE UNITED STATES HAS PURSUED FOUR CONSISTENT GOALS ON AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE SOVIETS COMMENCED THEIR BRUTAL OCCUPATION IN DECEMBER 1979:

WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES,
SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE,
RETURN OF THE REFUGEES IN SAFETY AND HONOR,
RESTORATION OF AFGHANISTAN'S SOVEREIGNTY AND
INDEPENDENCE.

THE FIRST GOAL -- SOVIET WITHDRAWAL -- HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES WON THE VICTORY. PAKISTANI AND U.S. SUPPORT WAS VITAL. THE THREE OTHER GOALS REMAIN TO BE ACHIEVED. DURING THE JUNE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO TO THE UNITED STATES, PRESIDENT BUSH DECLARED:

"THE MUJAHIDEEN . . . STRUGGLE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION GOES ON -- A GOAL THAT BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN CONTINUE TO SUPPORT. PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO AND I DISCUSSED WAYS TO ENCOURAGE A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN THAT WILL LEAD TO A NON-ALIGNED REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, WILLING TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, TO REPLACE THE ILLEGITIMATE REGIME IN KABUL. THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN WILL CONTINUE TO EXPLORE ANY SERIOUS AVENUE TOWARDS THIS END."

THE UNITED STATES, PAKISTAN, AND THE RESISTANCE STAND FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THAT WILL TRANSFER POWER AWAY FROM THE PDPA TO AN AFGHAN ENTITY TRULY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. THE SETTLEMENT SHOULD SATISFY THE OBJECTIVES OF SELF-DETERMINATION, RETURN OF THE REFUGEES AND THE RE-EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT AFGHAN NATION -- NOT ONE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF AN OUTSIDE POWER, BUT ONE THAT HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL OF ITS NEIGHBORS. THE RESISTANCE NEEDS OUR CONTINUING SUPPORT TO MAINTAIN A POSITION OF STRENGTH AS IT PURSUES A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT INCORPORATING THESE OBJECTIVES.

AIG. THE UNITED STATES WELCOMED THE CREATION OF THE AFGHAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN LATE FEBRUARY AS AN IMPORTANT STEP. WE ENCOURAGE THE LEADERSHIP OF THE AIG TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO BROADEN ITS BASE OF SUPPORT TO INCLUDE ALL MAJOR ELEMENTS OF AFGHAN SOCIETY, SUCH AS SHIAS, COMMANDERS AND SHURAS INSIDE AFGHANISTAN AND PROMINENT AFGHANS ABROAD. WE URGE ITS DEVELOPMENT AS A REPRESENTATIVE BODY, A VALID ALTERNATIVE AND REPLACEMENT FOR THE ILLEGITIMATE KABUL REGIME IMPOSED AND PROTECTED BY AN OUTSIDE POWER. MY RECENT TALKS WITH AIG LEADERS AND MANY OTHER AFGHANS REVEALED THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING PROBLEMS, THE AIG HAS STAFFED MANY OF ITS MINISTRIES WHOSE SERVICES ARE RELEVANT TO ITS STRUGGLE. IT IS BEGINNING TO FORGE ADDITIONAL LINKS WITH SHURAS AND COMMANDERS, AND TO IMPLEMENT NEW ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES AND REHABILITATION PROGRAMS INSIDE AFGHANISTAN.

PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RESISTANCE, BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY, WAS FORGED EARLY IN THE RESISTANCE STRUGGLE. THE AFGHANS ARE CLEARLY GRATEFUL FOR PAKISTAN'S SUSTAINED HELP. DURING HER TALKS IN WASHINGTON, PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO STATED:


"PAKISTAN REMAINS COMMITTED TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE AFGHAN PROBLEM, WHEREBY THE BRAVE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO FREELY CHOOSE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM OUTSIDE. PAKISTAN'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND DEMOCRACY ARE FUNDAMENTAL."

THE SOVIET UNION. IN 1986, PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TERMED AFGHANISTAN "A BLEEDING WOUND." THE WOUND WAS INFLICTED BY MOSCOW. SOVIET BLOOD IS NO LONGER FLOWING. AFGHAN BLOOD CONTINUES TO FLOW FROM THE WOUND. MOSCOW IS IN A POSITION TO APPLY THE TOURNIQUET. WE URGE THE SOVIET UNION TO COOPERATE ACTIVELY IN ACHIEVING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THAT RECOGNIZES THE RIGHT OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FORM OF GOVERNMENT.

- 9 -

UN. THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES MUST WORK OUT THE FUTURE POLITICAL COURSE OF THEIR COUNTRY. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS EITHER APPROPRIATE OR POSSIBLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO TRY TO FORCE A SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN AT THIS TIME. THE CURRENT ROLE OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ACCOMPANYING UNGOMAP OBSERVERS IS APPROPRIATE FOR NOW; HE IS IN THE AREA, ACTIVELY SOUNDING OUT PARTIES, PROBING FOR OPENINGS, AND AVAILABLE TO WORK WITH THE PARTIES WHEN OR IF AN OPPORTUNITY ARISES.

MR. CHAIRMAN, HERE IN WASHINGTON, WE HAVE JUST CONCLUDED PRODUCTIVE TALKS WITH PAKISTAN ON AFGHANISTAN AT THE EXPERTS LEVEL. WE WILL BE CONDUCTING FURTHER EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS ON AFGHANISTAN IN THE COMING WEEKS. WE HOPE OUR SOVIET COLLEAGUES WILL ADOPT A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH THAN HERETOFORE IN COOPERATING TO PRODUCE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THAT PERMITS SELF-DETERMINATION IN AFGHANISTAN, FREE OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. WE REMAIN CONFIDENT THAT THE U.S. POLICY OF WORKING TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHILE CONTINUING OUR SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IF WE HAVE THE PATIENCE AND STEADFASTNESS TO STAY THE COURSE.



Additional Questions for Ambassador Tomsen

Submitted by Hon. Michael McNulty

QUESTION. The press has reported serious fighting among major Afghan resistance groups based in Pakistan, thus increasing the prospects of a long war and decreasing the prospects of peace. Does the U.S. have any options to bring about a more effective and united Afghan resistance?

ANSWER. Unfortunately, internecine conflict among Afghan resistance groups has occurred throughout the last ten years of war in Afghanistan. Many of the root causes for these conflicts are endemic to Afghan society. As you know, the most dramatic incident of such conflict reportedly happened in July in Takhar Province when as many as thirty mujahedin allegedly were executed. We deplore and regret such incidents which, as you note, increase the prospects for a long war. We have welcomed the establishment by the AIG of an commission to investigate this issue. We understand that the commission has arrived in Takhar and is proceeding with its mission.

We, and other nations friendly to the Afghan resistance, continually have counselled the resistance to remain united and to refrain from actions that could detract from resistance cohesion and serve to strengthen the staying power of the Najib regime. We specifically have suggested that important Afghan interests groups--Shias and other minorities, for example--be brought closer to the resistance's major political manifestation, the Afghan Interim Government. We have urged that the AIG reach out to important commanders and/or shuras (councils) in an effort to broaden its base and be seen as a

more representative body by the people of Afghanistan. We hope that the AIG can serve as a device to settle internecine disputes before they get out of hand and threaten the unity and drive of the Resistance effort against the PDPA regime.

While our efforts will continue to encourage an end to internecine resistance conflict and to see that the political arm of the AIG broadens its base, we recognize that the unity of the Afghans cannot be imposed from without. Clearly, it must be developed by the Afghans themselves.

QUESTION. UN Under-Secretary General Diego Cordovez has proposed the formation of a broad-based government with elements from the Afghan resistance, the Kabul regime, the ex-King and independent reputed Afghans. The proposal has received support from the field commanders, the Soviet Union, a few resistance groups and the ex-King. Would the U.S. consider such a proposal?

ANSWER. We have welcomed the UN's engagement in the search for a political solution to the Afghan issue. It is not up to the United States to decide the future government for Afghanistan. That must be left to the Afghans themselves. Any proposal toward a solution must have the support of the Afghan people to have any chance of success. We do not believe that the Afghan resistance has any interest in sharing power with the Najib regime which the resistance has fought to bring down for the last ten years.

We know of no major resistance field commander who has endorsed a plan which provides for a significant role for the PDPA regime.

Furthermore, former Afghan King Zahir Shah remains on public record--most recently reiterated in early September--with his refusal to be party to negotiations with the Najib regime. He has been clear in his rejection of any future role in power for the Najib regime.

QUESTION. Reports persist that U.S. aid under Pakistani influence favors the more radical resistance factions because of their military strength. Is this in the best interest of the U.S.? Does it not deprive many people, who do not belong to these groups, of assistance?

ANSWER. I am unable to address in an unclassified forum the issue of covert assistance to the Afghan resistance. _

The USAID humanitarian assistance program for Afghanistan is designed to assist war-affected Afghans and it is not targeted toward one party or another. This assistance is provided for the most vulnerable and needy. It was and is not designed to be used as a political tool. The problems of reaching those in need in Afghanistan stem from considerations such as warfare, transportation, geography, topography, and climate, rather than from political considerations.

QUESTION. The Soviet Union has agreed to contribute \$600 million for the UN development efforts while Japan has pledged \$60 million. The United States, however, has offered only \$17 million. What criteria does the UN have to meet before the U.S. will contribute substantially to its reconstruction efforts?

ANSWER. We and others question the Soviet Union's pledge of \$400 million rubles--\$600 million at the official, but inflated, rate of

exchange--for UN reconstruction efforts for Afghanistan. The specifics regarding the pledge remain very vague, including how much of this material really will be supplied through the UN. It appears that most of the pledge provides for goods in kind, rather than in hard currency.

The United States recently contributed \$10 million to the UN'S demining/mine awareness program for Afghan refugees. We have requested an additional \$16 million for the UN Trust Fund for Afghanistan in FY 1990. In addition, the bilateral U.S. cross border assistance program is helping to improve conditions for refugees when they return and lay the groundwork for reconstruction.

Submitted by Hon. Elizabeth J. Patterson

QUESTION. What is the U.S. doing to assist the Afghan people who have been internally displaced in Afghanistan?

ANSWER. The United States, through our Agency for International Development Program for Afghan Affairs, currently assists the people in liberated areas of Afghanistan to meet a wide variety of social and economic needs. This humanitarian assistance includes food, commodities (clothing, shelter, etc.), health, education, transportation, and rural development. Many of the beneficiaries of this assistance have been displaced from their homes in Afghanistan. USAID's cross border humanitarian assistance program began in 1985. Since then, USAID has delivered approximately \$230 million worth of assistance into liberated areas of Afghanistan.

Submitted by Hon. Bill Emerson

QUESTION. Does the United States support a political settlement in Afghanistan? What kind of a political settlement would you find acceptable? Do you believe a negotiated end to the war is desirable or possible?

ANSWER. It is the policy of the government of the United States to support a political settlement to end the turmoil that Afghanistan has undergone since 1978. This political settlement must be accepted by the Afghan people, whose representatives must be party to the negotiations that may lead to a settlement. The nature and form of a post-war Afghan government should be determined by the Afghan people. We believe that such a settlement is desirable. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, such a settlement will fulfill the remaining U.S. foreign policy goals for Afghanistan: self determination of the Afghan people; return of the refugees in safety and honor; and the restoration of Afghanistan's sovereignty and independence. I believe that such a settlement is possible.

QUESTION. When will the United States shift diplomatic recognition to the mujahedin? Would allowing U.S. officials into Afghanistan, in addition to aiding the cross-border operation, not be a logical step toward diplomatic recognition of the resistance?

ANSWER. The U.S. requires that a government must show that it has the potential to remain in power, that it can effectively control and administer territory, that it can reach and implement international commitments before it can be recognized as a legitimate government. As of today, the AIG has not met the criteria for recognition. Allowing U.S. officials into Afghanistan

would not necessarily be a step toward diplomatic recognition of the resistance. The policy on forbidding U.S. officials from entering Afghanistan was formed because of security and legal concerns; it had nothing to do with the question of recognition.

QUESTION. Some have said that the one thing we should have learned from the experiences of the British and the Russians in Afghanistan over the past 150 years is that it is a mistake to get embroiled in Afghan internal affairs. Should, or can, the United States do anything to influence events inside of Afghanistan?

ANSWER. I agree that the historical experience of the British and the Soviets in Afghanistan clearly shows that it is a mistake for outside powers to become entangled in Afghan internal affairs. The United States does not intend to become involved in internal Afghan matters. We seek no strategic, military, economic, or commercial advantage in Afghanistan. The assistance that we have rendered to the Afghan resistance was designed to allow the Afghans to regain their freedom and to re-establish an independent Afghanistan.

QUESTION. Is the fundamentalist character of the mujahideen likely to be turned into anti-American and anti-western feelings?

ANSWER. The mujahedin come from the full spectrum of Afghan society. Some mujahedin are suspicious of the West and western influences. Some are fundamentalists or islamic activists; others are traditionalists; others are modernists. The fundamentalists are of the Sunni sect of Islam, which is prevalent in Pakistan and in Saudi Arabia. This sect does not have an Iranian type of theocratic structure. The Afghan mujahedin across the board recognize the

assistance rendered their cause by the United States and other western supporters. They are grateful for that assistance. I do not believe that anti-American or anti-western feelings will be widespread in post-war Afghanistan.

QUESTION. How representative and how popular is the Afghan Interim Government? Is there any truth to recent press reports that the mujahideen and the AIG are losing popular support?

ANSWER. The Afghan Interim Government needs to broaden its base to include more representatives of important segments of Afghan society, including minority groups and important commanders and shuras now in the field. The AIG is attempting to become more representative. We are encouraging its efforts. The AIG remains the major political arm of the Afghan resistance. It is the most representative Afghan body now in existence. It was formed by the most representative gathering of Afghans in the last seventeen years which still excluded a range of tribal leaders, important commanders and Shia groups.

We do not believe that the mujahedin and the AIG are losing support of the Afghan people. The AIG recently has established a number of regional shuras in Afghanistan in an effort to broaden its base.

QUESTION. Is the Najibullah regime improving its position among the Afghan people?

ANSWER. We do not believe that the Najib regime has improved its position with the people of Afghanistan. It retains power through

force of arms and through a brutal internal security apparatus that has terrorized the populace and which has been guilty of gross abuses of human rights. The PDPA regime continues to have little support in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union currently is spending over \$250 million per month to keep the Najib regime in power.

QUESTION. Last year at this time it was hoped that Afghan refugees would be moving back into their country. Instead, refugees have been fleeing Afghanistan to escape renewed fighting. When do you foresee a return of the refugees to Afghanistan?

ANSWER. There has been only scattered and very limited return of Afghan refugees back to Afghanistan. Since the Soviet withdrawal, more refugees have entered Pakistan than have returned to Afghanistan. For the most part, the Afghan refugees fled their country because of fighting and general security concerns. We do not believe that the refugees will return in any significant numbers until the fighting is over in Afghanistan and the general security situation is stabilized. This will not happen until power is transferred from the Najib regime, as the mujahedin will continue to fight until Najib and the PDPA are removed from power.

QUESTION. What specific plans has the United States made to assist the eventual return of the refugees? What is the United Nations doing to assist the repatriation of refugees.

ANSWER. Since 1985, the United States through A.I.D. has been providing humanitarian assistance to Afghans inside of Afghanistan. In the fall of 1988, the USAID strategy was revised from providing

assistance to all liberated areas of Afghanistan. It now emphasizes areas to which the majority of the refugees are expected to return.

We expect the UN and the World Bank to take the lead in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, a task that requires greater resources than donors can supply bilaterally. The objectives of A.I.D.'s program through 1991 are to meet the pressing needs of repatriation and rehabilitation. The priority is ensuring food security and restoring agricultural production. To achieve these goals, we will support projects to clear mines, improve transportation capacity, supply fertilizers and seed, and provide essential commodities. A key element of our strategy is and will remain to reduce narcotics production.

The United Nations has done an excellent job of mobilizing resources for the refugee camps in Pakistan. However, much work remains to be done on building the capacity to support the eventual repatriation of the refugees. The UN Coordinator for Afghanistan mobilized contributions of nearly \$900 million from 30 donor countries in FY-89, although this figure is exaggerated by valuing the \$600 million in-kind Soviet pledge at the official exchange rate.

Through the Co-ordinator's Operation Salaam, eight inter-agency missions have been sent into Afghanistan to assess humanitarian needs and to develop plans for the future. We are working with the UN system on the ground in Pakistan to help the UN get ready to use these resources for repatriation and reconstruction.

QUESTION. Has any progress been made on supplying mine-removal equipment and training to Afghans? Has the Soviet Union supplied mine field maps?

ANSWER. The United Nations Office of the Coordinator for Afghanistan has established a program to teach mine awareness and mine disposal training to Afghans. The training is being conducted at sites near Peshawar and Quetta and at selected refugee camps. Units from the United States, France, Turkey, Canada, Italy, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the Federal Republic of Germany, Egypt, Norway, Morocco, and Algeria have participated in this effort. As of August 31, 1989, the total number of Afghan graduates of the program is 2,963, of whom 1,523 were trained by the U.S. contingent. The number of refugees who were trained in simple mine awareness is 1,022.

One problem with the program has been the lack of practice mine models for use as training aids. This problem only has been partially solved by the local purchase of three hundred mine models. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has not provided any mine models requested for the training program. Nor has it provided any mine field maps.

QUESTION. Last year the United Nations announced a much publicized aid program for Afghanistan. What has this program actually accomplished? What obstructions, both internal and external, has the UN program faced?

ANSWER. The UN has developed an action plan for assisting the return of refugees and their rehabilitation. Prince Sadruddin Agha

Khan has been named the Co-ordinator for the United Nations Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programs relating to Afghanistan. Through its Operation Salaam, the UN coordinator's program has sent eight inter-agency missions into mujahedin controlled areas of Afghanistan to assess the needs for the future. Follow-up missions are being organized. It has established an operational presence in the field with offices in Afghanistan (Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Hairaton); Pakistan (Islamabad, Peshawar, and Quetta); Iran (Tehran); and the USSR (Termez).

It will take the lead to coordinate the shift from the current UN-led refugee program to resettlement and rehabilitation when the return begins.

The greatest obstruction that the UN program has faced are the operational difficulties posed by the ongoing armed conflict in Afghanistan.

QUESTION. In your testimony you stated that the Administration expects the UN and the World Bank "to take the lead in the reconstruction of Afghanistan." Why do you place such responsibility on international organizations when they have been so ineffective so far?

ANSWER. The task of reconstruction in Afghanistan will be enormous. So will the funding that such an effort will require. The needed resources will be beyond what any individual donor nation, including the United States, will be willing or able to

contribute. This fact argues for the responsibility for the reconstruction of Afghanistan being placed with the UN, the World Bank, and other international organizations.

QUESTION. What has been the Soviet contribution to the humanitarian needs of Afghanistan? How much food are they giving to the Kabul regime? How is this aid being distributed? Does it reach those in greatest need, or does it go to those who are loyal to the regime?

ANSWER. It is most difficult for me to give an exact analysis of the Soviet contribution to humanitarian needs of Afghanistan. An Afghan formerly associated with the Kabul regime contends that the Soviet Union provides the regime with 900 million rubles worth of in-kind assistance annually. Part of this assistance is 200,000 tons of the 300,000 tons of wheat sent to Afghanistan by the Soviets.

The former Afghan official describes a system of food distribution that clearly favors those associated with the Najib regime:

-- State employees now receive a large (unspecified) percentage of their salaries in basic foodstuffs (wheat flour, sugar, ghee). Formerly, state employees paid low subsidized prices for this food, but last year it was decided to make the food free rather than increasing government employees' salaries. On the average, state employees receive 50 kilos of wheat flour, 7 kilos of sugar, and 5 to 6 liters of ghee free each month. About 450,000 state employees countrywide are covered by this system.

-- The military also receive free food. In addition to the basic

commodities, they receive meat and the right to purchase consumer goods at 20% of the regular price. This system is separate from the system which serves state employees.

-- The state retail system distributes food and other goods through retail stores.

In addition to the official channels, there is an open (black) market in Afghanistan. Market prices of flour, meat, eggs, milk, etc have risen sharply since 1985.

In our view the Soviet supply system and the Afghan distribution system clearly favors members and supporters of the regime.

QUESTION. What is your best estimate of the total cost of the Soviet military investment in Afghanistan since December 1979?

ANSWER. It is most difficult to estimate the total cost of the Soviet military investment in Afghanistan since December, 1979. However, Soviet journals have reported that the Soviets have spent \$70 billion on Afghanistan. I cannot confirm this figure.

QUESTION. Prior to July 1989, what was the nature and extent of U.S. direct contacts with the mujahideen? Which officials and what departments and officers were responsible for communication with the Afghan resistance?

ANSWER. Prior to July 1989, overt direct contacts were maintained by the U.S. and the Afghan mujahedin through a variety of channels. Officials from the the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and the U.S.

Consulate in Peshawar met frequently with a wide range of personalities active in the Afghan resistance. The Consulate in Peshawar was responsible for day-to-day contact with the Afghan Interim Government and with the seven major resistance parties headquartered in Peshawar. Contacts were also maintained with resistance figures not based in Peshawar, in Quetta for example. Contacts of the Consulate and Embassy included resistance political figures, commanders visiting Pakistan, intellectuals, religious figures, and refugees. They also included representatives from Afghanistan's minority communities, including Shias. Maintaining close contact with the Afghan resistance was and is a high priority for our posts in Pakistan. Officials tasked with the responsibility for maintaining these contacts included State Department and USIS officers posted to Peshawar, officers in the Political Section and Refugee Office in the Embassy, and USAID officers active in our humanitarian assistance effort for Afghanistan. Before my appointment in June, 1989 as Special Envoy with the rank of Ambassador to the Afghan Resistance, a more junior officer served as Special Envoy to the Resistance at the Embassy in Islamabad from August, 1988.

Officers in the Department of State and at a number of posts overseas also maintain contacts with resistance personalities.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LARRY CRANDALL, A.I.D. REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHAN
AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

CROSS-BORDER HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The Cross-Border Humanitarian Assistance program (CBHA) was created by Congress in 1985 to provide humanitarian assistance to war-affected Afghanistan. Responding to the devastation brought about by the Soviet occupation and nearly ten years of war, the program enjoys strong administration and bipartisan Congressional support as evidenced by its exponential growth. Funding has increased from an initial \$8 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 1985 to more than \$100 million in FY 1989. The program is administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development's (A.I.D.) Office of the A.I.D. Representative for Afghanistan Affairs (O/AID/Rep). The CBHA uses funding from four main sources: (1) A.I.D. economic assistance funds -- both Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Funds (ESF); (2) P.L. 480 Title II agricultural commodities grants; (3) Department of Defense Afghan Humanitarian Relief excess agricultural commodities and transportation funds; and (4) in FY 1989, State Department Emergency Refugee and Migration Account (ERMA) funds. The CBHA is a separate and distinct program from the U.S. Government's humanitarian assistance to refugees in Pakistan, which is the responsibility of the Department of State, and from the A.I.D. program for Pakistan.

The war has taken a very high toll on Afghanistan's pre-war population of approximately 15 million. There are now (with new refugees continuing to arrive from Jalalabad and Kabul) an estimated 5 million refugees relocated in Pakistan and Iran, an internal displacement of an additional 2 million, over one million killed, and countless hundreds of thousands injured, maimed, crippled, widowed, and orphaned.

Afghanistan's agriculture, health, and education sectors, for which there was substantial bilateral and multilateral assistance from many sources before 1978, have been devastated over the past decade. Agricultural production has shrunk to a level estimated to be as low as 50 percent of the pre-war level. Declines are attributed to the neglect and destruction of irrigation systems and agricultural lands, the widespread loss of draft animals, labor shortages, the lack of agricultural supplies such as fertilizer, and quality of seed.

Rural health care became almost nonexistent, both in terms of numbers of trained technicians and resources. Recent data indicate that Afghanistan has one of the highest infant mortality rates in the world at 163 per 1,000 live births. Moreover, life expectancy at birth is only 39 years, compared to 57 years in neighboring Iran and 54 years in Pakistan.

The education system was yet another victim of the war. Pre-war statistics indicate a maximum 12 percent literacy rate for both men and women. This has worsened because the vast

- 2 -

majority of young people have received no education over the past ten years. Education which has occurred has been of marginal quality, conducted with limited human and material resources. Higher education barely exists. Kabul University's engineering and agriculture laboratories have been stripped and most of the trained faculty and staff have fled to the West or been killed.

These three sectors, plus relief assistance, are those upon which the CBHA has focused its efforts in liberated areas of Afghanistan and where the United States Government is by far the lead donor. The Government of Pakistan has also contributed significantly to the program's success through its cooperation, administration, and logistic support, plus provision of relief supplies.

The actual implementation of the CBHA program is conducted by U.S. contract organizations and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) in cooperation with Afghans. Working with the professional committees of the Afghan mujahideen's Seven-Party Alliance in Peshawar, Pakistan, and more recently, the Afghan Interim Government (AIG), the CBHA has helped create and develop viable Afghan institutions for agriculture, health and education as well as effective Afghan mechanisms for the delivery of food and other commodities. Strengthening indigenous Afghan capabilities is important for the long-term objective of establishing an independent and self-governing Afghanistan.

Much has been accomplished in the short life of the CBHA. Through FY 1989, over a quarter of a billion dollars will have been committed for delivery of agriculture, health and primary education services as well as food and other essential commodities to targeted regions in Afghanistan. Major results as of June 1 are:

- 1,264 basic health workers have been trained, 889 health facilities in 27 provinces have been established, and 500 tons of medical supplies have been shipped into Afghanistan.

- 1,021 schools are serving 105,000 students, 1,684 primary school kits have been prepared as well as 500,000 textbooks printed, 196 district directors have been trained, and over 29,000 mujahideen have attended literacy classes.

- foodpacks for 28 million meals have been provided, about 135,000 metric tons of P.L. 480 wheat have been delivered, partly through 700 truckloads (using U.S. supplied trucks) in 37 convoys.

- 300 irrigation schemes have been cleaned and repaired, nearly 200 tons of seed and 10,000 tons of fertilizer have

- 3 -

been provided, and 400 kilometers of road have been built or repaired.

-- over 700 wounded Afghans have been treated in the U.S. and 15 other countries through the Afghan Humanitarian Relief program, and 72 DOD and commercial flights have brought tons of non-lethal surplus DOD equipment and PVO-donated commodities.

-- over 8,000 Afghans financed by A.I.D. are working to provide humanitarian assistance to their country.

With the February 15, 1989 completion of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the formation of the AIG, the focus of the program has expanded beyond humanitarian assistance to providing selective support for the Interim Government (i.e., non-political collaboration with functioning and capable ministries such as health, education, agriculture and finance) and preparing for the resettlement of millions of returning refugees and displaced persons. The U.S. is particularly interested in ensuring that conditions inside Afghanistan are secure and free from mines and that the existing and returning populations will be able to sustain themselves and begin the enormous task of rebuilding a nation.

This task is so great that no single donor nation alone can provide the resources required; the need for this extraordinary level of assistance and cooperation requires an international effort led by the United Nations as well as continued U.S. assistance and other bilateral resources. Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan was named Coordinator for Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programs Relating to Afghanistan in May 1988. Under his "Operation Salam" program, he has the task of coordinating the Afghan programs of all UN agencies and donor countries and is seeking contributions of commodities and cash through the UN. Initial UN efforts have focused on mine clearance training and awareness assisted by army teams from the U.S. and other countries. In addition to the CBHA program, the USG is supporting this UN effort.

The U.S. will continue to support humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. The anticipated FY 1991 budget request for the CBHA program reflects a further increase over that of FY 1990. Attached is a brief description of the CBHA projects and programs and a summary of outlays to date.

Project/Program DescriptionsHealth Sector Assistance

The Health Sector Support Project (HSSP) is implementing a training program for basic health workers and is setting up a three-tier medical system of first aid stations, clinics and district hospitals inside Afghanistan. An A.I.D.-funded firm, Management Sciences for Health (MSH), provides technical assistance through the Alliance Health Committee (AHC) of the Seven-Party Alliance and now works through the AIG's Ministry of Health.

Education Sector Assistance

The Education Sector Support Project (ESSP) finances the Education Center for Afghanistan which provides direct support (textbooks, supplies, teachers training and stipends) to Afghan primary education, literacy training for mujahideen and provides some non-degree technical training in the U.S.. Implementation began through the Education Council of the Seven-Party Alliance which is now incorporated into the AIG's Ministry of Education, with A.I.D.-financed technical assistance from the University of Nebraska at Omaha's (UNO) Center for Afghanistan Studies.

Agriculture Sector Assistance

The Agriculture Sector Support Project (ASSP) works to provide resources in support of increased agricultural productivity in Afghanistan. A variety of delivery mechanisms have been established to deliver agricultural goods and equipment and to provide for rehabilitation of war-damaged water systems and agricultural infrastructure. An A.I.D.-funded contractor, Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA), is helping to implement the project. The ASSP will soon begin a new agribusiness component, budgeted at \$33 million, to improve the delivery of scarce agricultural inputs through private sector channels.

Commodity Export

The Commodity Export Program provides humanitarian commodities and related procurement and logistical services to support Afghans remaining in their country. More recently, a trucking transportation system has been developed for delivery of humanitarian goods inside Afghanistan, including a system of resource allocation to the Afghan parties. The current A.I.D.-financed contractor, RONCO Corporation, has helped furnish a wide range of basic humanitarian goods such as food and clothing. A separate activity located at an animal holding facility has provided training for mule handlers in an

- 5 -

effort to expand the transportation system by providing pack animals in addition to trucks. The Afghan Construction and Logistics Unit (ACLU) operates a fleet of more than 100 A.I.D.-donated trucks as well as heavy equipment used in the repair of roads and bridges. A newly selected contractor, Construction Control Services Corporation (CCSC), is providing technical assistance to the ACLU.

PVO Co-financing and Rural Assistance

A.I.D. finances 17 Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) from seven countries through two separate projects: 1) the PVO Co-financing and 2) the Rural Assistance Projects. Through the former, A.I.D. funds PVOs in the health sector, both for direct provision of health services inside Afghanistan by expatriate and Afghan staff, and through training of Afghan health service providers at all levels. Other PVO co-financed activities under this project have included food aid, education and agricultural production. The Rural Assistance Project was designed to encourage PVOs who were distributing cash-for-food to move into activities that are more development-oriented and with an agricultural production bias. The project is administered by the International Rescue Committee.

Afghan Humanitarian Relief

Department of Defense (DOD) funds are used "for the purpose of providing transportation and commodities for humanitarian relief of persons displaced or who are refugees because of the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union." (Sector 305 of PL 99-1455). Surplus DOD and donated or project-financed humanitarian supplies are flown to Pakistan by the U.S. Air Force commercially and then transported overland for use by war-affected Afghans. Airlifts of war-wounded Afghans to U.S. and third countries for medical treatments are also financed with these funds. The medical services are donated by U.S. and European specialists and medical institutions. The Intergovernmental Committee on Migration (ICM) manages the latter element of the humanitarian relief effort.

P.L. 480 Title II

The objective of the P.L. 480 Title II program "Emergency Food Relief for War-Affected Afghans" is making a continuing contribution to relieving the plight of war-affected Afghans by ensuring that food stocks are readily available. These grants, in addition to providing actual food commodities, include funds in partial support of the costs incurred by the Government of Pakistan and Afghan organizations in transporting the commodities. An initial food-for-work program to be implemented by CARE is also being supported.

- 6 -

Technical Services and Support

This project provides funds needed to identify, develop, evaluate and support the above projects, including technical advisory services.

Additional Questions for Larry Crandall

Submitted by Hon. Michael R. McNulty

SAVE THE CHILDREN FEDERATION - US

Mr. McNulty: Describe, in detail, the Save the Children income-generation project for women in Afghanistan?

Answer: The Save the Children Federation - US (SCF) began implementing a Women's Craft Income Generating Program in Afghanistan over five years ago. Five such projects are now in operation, providing crafts training and marketing assistance for an estimated 9,000 Afghan women and youths.

SCF purchases the crafts from the project and markets them through existing SCF Pakistan and export market channels. During the next year, SCF will expand its marketing activities in the U.S. SCF purchases the crafts at a minimum 10% markup over direct costs (labor, material, finishing & packaging), and if items can bear higher markup such will be done. The project markup attempts to cover all direct costs of labor, materials, finishing and packaging. Any succeeding SCF markups are used to cover

marketing costs and to purchase further craft products. SCF does not benefit by any marketing markups. All sales are utilized in project operation.

Shortly, this project will operate cross border to provide prepackaged materials and guidance for the production of marketable crafts in Afghanistan. By the end of the project, 1,000 Afghan women should be earning an average of 1,000 Afghanis per month - estimated to provide a 35-65% increase in total family income. The project will focus primarily on hand-embroidered crafts.

Once inside Afghanistan, the program will seek to establish village Craft Centers located where women may come and go unimpeded by cultural restrictions. The centers will facilitate skills upgrading and quality control, and also serve as a location for the participating women, isolated and traumatized by war, to provide mutual support to one another.

U.S. HUMANITARIAN AID

Mr. McNulty:

How much of U.S. Humanitarian aid is being provided for food relief and medical care? What proportion of that is being provided through American private voluntary organizations and Afghan non-governmental agencies and what proportion is being provided through the structure of the Afghan interim government (AIG)?

Answer:

Of the \$126.3 million total FY 1989 U.S. Humanitarian Cross-Border program, approximately \$50 million was provided for food relief and \$22 million for medical care.

Of the \$50 million total for food relief, about 8 percent is being provided through American private voluntary organizations (PVO). Participating PVOs include CARE and Save the Children. There are virtually no Afghan non-governmental agencies to implement a food relief program.

All of the above assistance is coordinated through the AIG.

In the area of medical care, an estimated 63 percent of total assistance is coordinated through the Health Ministry of the AIG. About 32 percent is provided to several PVOs such as Freedom Medicine and the International Medical Corps to provide medical training and assistance.

In addition, the Afghanistan Humanitarian Relief (The "McCollum" Program) also provides medical-related assistance through a U.S. PVO and the Intergovernmental Committee on Migration (ICM) valued at over \$4,000. These PVOs collaborate with the AIG and the resistance alliance parties in implementing the patient evacuation program for pro bono treatment in Europe and the U.S.

U.S. PVOS

Mr. McNulty: U.S. PVOs which are receiving U.S. aid are reportedly being pressured by the U.S. government to work with and through the structure of the Afghan Interim Government rather than with individual commanders or Afghan non-governmental organizations. Is this the case? If so, is it wise to draw humanitarian agencies into an essentially political issue? Is the U.S. pressuring UN agencies also to work only with the Afghan Interim Government?

Answer U.S. policy supports the Afghan Interim Government. In that context, A.I.D.'s cross border humanitarian program requires PVOs to coordinate their activities with the Afghan Interim Government just as we require PVOs to work with the government in other A.I.D.-assisted countries. Direct assistance to regional entities has, in fact, been the modus operandi of most of the PVO program. We do, however, encourage all donors in the cross-border program to coordinate activities, particularly those in the same sector, e.g., health care, education. This does not imply approval of PVO programs other than the normal registration process that is required by the Government of Pakistan. Rather, proper coordination avoids duplication of efforts and maximizes the impact of our resources.

U.S. HUMANITARIAN AID

Mr. McNulty:

What is your estimate of the proportion of U.S. humanitarian aid that is siphoned off as it passes through Pakistani or Afghan resistance hands or otherwise fails to be delivered to its intended recipients?

Answer:

We have in place inside Afghanistan and along the border various mechanisms to verify that supplies are indeed reaching the intended beneficiaries. As a further check, we monitor the primary markets (bazaars) in Peshawar as well as bazaars in nearby border areas since these are the places where diverted commodities are most likely to be marketed. We have found little evidence of food flowing back into these markets for sale. The program does, of course, operate under very unusual circumstances which preclude the full end-use monitoring typical of other A.I.D projects. We are prepared to take follow up action if specific evidence of diversion or corruption is brought to our attention.

Submitted by Hon. Elizabeth J. Patterson

FOOD SUPPLY

Mrs. Patterson: Are adequate food supplies being distributed to the Afghan refugees in the refugee camps in Pakistan? Who is supplying the food? Just PVOs?

Answer: Wheat is allocated to the refugees at the rate of 500 grams per day, per refugee; equivalent to 15 kg per month or 180 kg per year which is deemed to be nutritionally adequate. Other food items such as edible oils, sugar and tea are also distributed to the refugees. Over the last nine years, starvation, serious malnutrition, or serious water shortages have not been reported. UN organizations such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP) channeled this assistance to the refugees. Resources to support their programs have come from the USG and other donors. PVOs are not generally involved in food distribution in the Afghan refugee camps.

Mrs. Patterson: What exactly is contained in the "packet" of food? (This question is in response to testimony given by one of the witnesses

regarding the distribution of "packets of food for a family of four that lasts seven days..."")

Answer:

The A.I.D. Representative-supplied food packets currently contain 4 kg rice, 2 kg lobia (kidney beans), 2 kg dal chana (chick peas), 1 kg dates, 900 grams ghee, 150 grams black tea, 500 grams dried green peas, 150 grams curry powder, and 1 kg sugar. The packet is designed to meet the basic nutritional requirements of four adults for a week.

These packets are for displaced Afghans in Afghanistan. Packets are not supplied to the refugee camps in Pakistan.

Mrs. Patterson: Is the food really getting to the families in the refugee camps? How do we know exactly who the food is going to? Is it reaching the people we are aiming to feed or is it being diverted to others?

Answer:

Pakistan Government camp administrators and the UN staffs (World Food Program) monitor overall food distribution. There has been little evidence of diversion of food supplies nor is there any evidence of starvation or serious malnutrition in the camps.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION ASSISTANCE

Mrs. Patterson: What are we doing to help the Afghans produce their own food in Afghanistan? Are we doing anything to help them cultivate or produce crops that can be produced in a short period of time, to aid them in self-sufficiency?

Answer: A.I.D. is working to increase food production in Afghanistan and to assist Afghans in achieving self-reliance. Since 1987, A.I.D. has administered the Agricultural Sector Support Project in Afghanistan. The project purpose includes the restoration of agricultural productivity through small-scale rehabilitation (primarily small-scale irrigation systems and roads) and the provision of essential inputs (fertilizer, seeds) and other crucial commodities. The project focuses on agricultural revitalization as the key to the resumption of long-term, agriculturally-based economic growth. Project activities are located in the highly productive regions of the country (currently fifteen rehabilitation schemes are underway). These activities solve key problems which inhibit agricultural productivity providing basic agricultural inputs such as seeds and implements as well as assistance to repair damage to production infrastructure. Limited self-sufficiency for those farmers who

are able to plant and harvest their crops has occurred; however, due to the extensive damage throughout the country, and lack of the many inputs necessary for increased agricultural production, it is unlikely that total agricultural self-sufficiency will occur in the short term.

Submitted by Hon. Bill Emerson

HUMANITARIAN AID

Mr. Emerson: Who decides how humanitarian aid is distributed? What is the nature of the relationship between the U.S. Government, the Pakistani Government, and the Afghan Interim Government?

Answer: The U.S. Government currently distributes its assistance through technical committees, formerly under the Alliance and now absorbed by the Afghan Interim Government (AIG), and through U.S. and European private voluntary organizations (PVOs). We coordinate all PVO aid activities with the AIG. The Pakistani Government assists and plays a coordinating role in overall logistical efforts. We have also established working relationships with a number of shuras (local councils) and the mujahideen commanders in the field. We intend to continue working through a mix of channels to get assistance to needy Afghans until such time as

the situation inside Afghanistan permits us to operate through a legitimate Afghan government.

ALLOCATION OF ASSISTANCE

Mr. Emerson: How is U.S. assistance under the cross border program allocated among the resistance parties and leaders? What is the policy rationale that guides disbursement decisions?

Answer: Allocations of PL 480 wheat, plus sugar, ghee and other food items financed with A.I.D. dollar assistance under the Commodity Export Program are made monthly based on requests received from parties, commanders and shuras. The food is allocated on the bases of the expressed need and the ability of the parties to deliver resources to needy Afghans.

CROSS-BORDER PROGRAM

Mr. Emerson: Has the cross-border program been driven predominantly by political/military concerns? Has this interfered with the relief efforts?

Answer: The primary objective of the program is humanitarian, specifically to help needy and displaced Afghans inside the country to survive the ravages of war and prevent them from becoming refugees. By providing assistance to

liberated areas inside Afghanistan the program has, of course, served to support the cause of the mujahideen for self-determination which is a U.S. foreign policy objective.

AFGHAN INTERM GOVERNMENT

Mr. Emerson: Should the U.S., or anyone else, attempt to influence the political debate within the Afghan Interim Government by favoring one party over another with the disbursement of aid? Should aid be given to groups on the basis of population and need, or should we favor certain factions?

Answer: The U.S. Government does not use humanitarian assistance to favor one group or party over the other. Distribution of humanitarian resources has been based on need and the ability of parties to deliver assistance. It has been generally equitable among the seven parties, ranging from 12-17 percent. We support the Afghan Interim Government as a means to lessen the roles of parties in the distribution of humanitarian resources.

ROLE OF AFGHAN FUNDAMENTALISTS

Mr. Emerson: Have the Afghan fundamentalists interfered with humanitarian relief in

Afghanistan and in the refugee camps -- particularly to women?

Answer:

Projects monitored inside Afghanistan have not revealed any difficulties with the Afghan fundamentalists. Women have received medical attention at A.I.D.-financed clinics inside Afghanistan and primary school age girls have attended schools set up through the A.I.D.-sponsored education activities. Women also participate in the agricultural rehabilitation schemes funded by A.I.D. and we continue to seek ways to increase opportunities for their participation in other activities.

In Pakistan, there have been occasional reports from USG-funded PVOs of objections by fundamentalists to women's programs. However, this is not as far as we know a widespread problem. In fact, USG-funded PVOs operate a number of very successful income generation and health care programs for women.

For example, the Afghan Women's Center

(AWC) is being designed with assistance from International Rescue Committee (IRC) to be an independent forum in which educated, professional Afghan women organize training for other women in a variety of fields. English language training is in high demand. The AWC has enrolled 450 women in English language training, meeting only one third of the demand. The knowledge acquired in these programs will assist in the reintegration of women into Afghan society.

The Save the Children Federation began implementing a Women's Craft Income Generating project in five Afghan provinces over five years ago. Five such projects are now in operation, providing crafts training and marketing assistance for an estimated 9,000 Afghan women and youths. This project provides an outlet and a mutual support system for Afghan women. In addition, the U.N. and PVOs, such as International Rescue Committee, continue to run education and medical relief programs for females in the camps.

HUMANITARIAN AID

Mr. Emerson: How much humanitarian aid, in either tonnage or dollar amounts, has the United States provided to Afghans in their country since 1979? How much humanitarian aid, in comparable figures, has been provided by other donors countries and organizations inside Afghanistan?

Answer: The U.S. has been by far the largest donor of humanitarian aid, having given approximately \$920 million in humanitarian aid to the Afghan people in Afghanistan since 1980 through both bilateral and multilateral channels. For FY 1989, the U.S. pledged \$69.5 million to the UN for Afghan humanitarian aid (\$20 million for UNHCR; \$35 million worth of grain to WFP; and \$12 million for the mineclearing program). There remains \$2.5 million in unearmarked cash. We are providing another \$95 million in aid through our cross-border humanitarian assistance program which is administered by A.I.D, including \$10 million under the McCollum flight program.

Donors have thus far pledged some \$400 million for the UN-led relief effort. This

does not include the questionable Soviet pledge of 400 million rubles which has yet to be received by the UN.

The Soviets announced their 400 million ruble (\$600 million) pledge in October 1988. The donor community still has few details about the pledge. It appears to be in-kind, consisting of consumer goods, fuel and construction materials. It is still not clear whether this represents a new commitment on the part of the Soviets or whether their pledge is a repackaging of the previous Soviet bilateral program. We have told UN officials that it is important that there be no strings attached to the Soviet aid and that the UN have full control over distribution decisions associated with the aid.

OPERATION SALAM

Mr. Emerson:

How much aid has been delivered inside Afghanistan by "Operation Salam" since its inception? How much assistance has

been delivered inside Afghanistan by A.I.D. during the same period?

Answer:

The United Nations Office of the Coordinator for Afghanistan (UNOCA) reports that approximately \$11 million in aid has been delivered inside Afghanistan since June 1988. Some of this aid (approximately \$1.6 million) has been provided "in-kind" in food and consumer goods by the following countries:

-- India	\$600,000
-- Bulgaria	\$600,000
-- Mongolia	\$100,000
-- Iran	\$300,000

In addition, Turkey has provided 250 tons of wheat seed with no established value.

A total of approximately \$9 million in aid has been delivered by other U.N.

agencies under the umbrella of UNOCA as follows:

UNHCR	\$3,000,000
FAO	1,083,000
WHO	1,700,000
UNICEF	3,300,000

In most cases, this aid has been designated to support on-going activities of the particular U.N. agency in Afghanistan.

Funds made available to UNOCA, has allowed them to fund non-governmental organization projects inside Afghanistan. UNOCA has also distributed food valued at \$260,000 in Kabul, while \$100,000 in aid has been distributed to nomad returnees.

During the period Operation Salam has operated, \$167 million has been appropriated for assistance (including all food aid and McCollum flights) for

Afghanistan by our bilateral program, the great majority of that assistance has been delivered inside Afghanistan.

AFGHAN REFUGEES

Mr. Emerson: What is the extent of U.S. contributions to the refugee camps?

Answer: Since 1980, the U.S. has committed over \$600 million for Afghan refugee relief programs. Much of this aid has been channelled through the UNHCR, the World Food Program (WFP), and American and European PVOs. Over \$355 million has been in the form of PL-480 food commodities. Since 1980, the U.S. has donated over \$11 million to the ICRC, approximately \$8 million to LICROSS (League of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies) and \$16.1 million to American PVOs in support of their programs to assist Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

In response to the UN Special Appeal, the U.S. contributed \$12 million in-kind through U.S. military experts who are providing mine

awareness and demining training for Afghan refugees. We have also donated \$16.7 million worth of wheat.

In FY 1989, the USG provided \$69.5 million for multilateral refugee assistance (\$20 million for UNHCR, \$35 million in food aid for WFP, \$12 million for a mineclearing program and \$2.5 million in unearmarked cash). In addition, \$5 million for ICRC's emergency medical programs and \$2.5 million for the UN Trust Fund were pledged from ERMA funds.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HENRY R. NORMAN, PRESIDENT, VOLUNTEERS IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, VITA

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am Henry Norman, President of the Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA). VITA is a nonprofit, private voluntary organization which has worked in international development since 1959. VITA has extensive experience in agriculture programs and technologies. VITA currently manages food production or processing programs in eight developing countries, and responds to more than 1000 inquiries from developing countries each month; 50 percent of the requests deal with food production or food processing.

Thank you for inviting me to inform this Committee about our program to increase food production in selected areas of Southern Afghanistan. VITA's program is currently the largest U.S. funded cross-border agriculture program for Afghanistan. Despite this, the need greatly exceeds our effort.

Introduction

Prior to the Soviet invasion of their country, Afghan farmers could secure seed, fertilizer, insecticides and other materials from the government or private suppliers. This is no longer the case. Few materials are available and the quality of the seeds as well as production deteriorated during the period of occupation.

Gasoline and diesel fuel are in short supply and are very expensive. Many animals which survived were used as food. Tractors were destroyed. Inputs for agricultural production were depleted. And, the country was depopulated; more than 3 million Afghans took refuge in Pakistan.

VITA anticipates that in those rural areas where the project will be working, an infusion of improved seeds, fertilizer, insecticides, breeding stock, and agricultural equipment can have a positive and quick impact on food production.

VITA's Afghan Agricultural Sector Support Program

VITA's project started in April 1987 and will continue until at least the end of March 1990. It is funded by A.I.D. for \$10.6 million for this three year period.

VITA - Afghanistan

1

Our goals are to provide resources to support increased agricultural productivity in Afghanistan, and to support the growth of an institutional mechanism to use the resources. Another important goal is to train Afghan workers and farmers so that when the entire country is free there will be managers and skilled personnel to carry out the program throughout Afghanistan.

Underlying these goals is VITA's determination to ensure that the project is truly an Afghan project supported by the U.S., rather than a foreign program imposed upon the Afghans. VITA has been especially careful that the needs are perceived and articulated by Afghans themselves, and that Afghans respond to them.

VITA brings to this program intensive concern for and extensive experience in Afghanistan. I am pleased to have personally served as Management Advisor to the Afghanistan Minister of Public Health from 1976 to 1978.

Our Chief of Party is Mohammad Sediq who has 20 years experience in rural development, highlighted by his work as President of the Afghanistan Rural Development Department (1973-1978); in this capacity he held the title of Deputy Minister and reported directly to the President. He has held executive positions in rural development programs in Lesotho and Yemen and has provided senior consultant services in Jamaica, Malaysia, and Pakistan.

Mr. Sediq is joined by Dr. Abdul Wakil as Technical Coordinator. Dr. Wakil is the former Minister of State and Minister of Agriculture in Afghanistan. Prior to holding these positions, Dr. Wakil was a Member of Parliament, President of the Helmand Argandab Valley Authority, and Governor of Helmand Province. He is sometimes called by his fellow Afghans, "The Father of Scientific Agriculture."

These outstanding Afghan managers are joined by a staff of 286 qualified and experienced agriculture specialists working in Peshawar (Pakistan) and in 14 Agricultural Rehabilitation Schemes in Afghanistan; the staff is 89% Afghan and 11% Pakistani. All the staff are VITA employees.

By bringing to the management of this program leadership with such extensive Afghanistan experience and the complement of an almost all Afghan staff, VITA feels that it is meeting the goal of making the program an Afghan program with U.S. support. VITA believes that the rapid progress of this program is due to the caliber and unique insights of the leadership.

Some Program Results

VITA went to great effort to ensure that the program is properly staffed and that relationships within each province with

VITA - Afghanistan

representative groups are properly established. These local relationships are necessary to facilitate the entire process of sending equipment, seeds and seedlings, fertilizer, and training local leaders in improved farming methods to keep the delivery and implementation mechanism in place. A.I.D. and VITA see this project as long-term; therefore, the foundation is extremely important. VITA feels confident that it has assembled the best staff possible for the program, and that the relationships with local groups are solid.

VITA is now working in 14 Agricultural Rehabilitation Schemes (ARS) in the south-west and the eastern quadrant of Afghanistan. These Agriculture Rehabilitation Schemes are located in Kandahar, Ghazni, Wardak, Paktika, Baghlan, Logar, Parwan, Kabul, Takhar, and Kunar provinces.

Through the infrastructure it has already developed, VITA has sent into Afghanistan 300 wheat threshers, 200 rice huskers, 1,800 water pumps, \$300,000 of spare parts, 500 bullocks, 15 tractors and implements, seed and fertilizer for 1,000 farmers and is in the process of sending 35 tons of improved wheat seed and 9,000 tons of fertilizer.

VITA has established two nurseries in Pakistan for improved horticulture stock to replace stock destroyed during the war. Contracts have been made with farmers to grow 2 million seedlings for reforestation/afforestation. To date, 2700 root stock of apple, peach and almond trees have been sent to seven provinces in Afghanistan. In addition, 551,000 root cuttings of poplar and mulberry were sent to four provinces.

Because irrigation is so critical for the reestablishment or expansion of agriculture, 421 karezes (underground water tunnels) and irrigation canals have been rehabilitated, and work is in progress on an additional 1448 projects.

Primary, secondary and tertiary roads were neglected or destroyed during the war and are in serious need of repair. VITA is currently working on 400 kms of rural roads, and work has been completed on approximately 260 kms.

Eleven training programs for technicians and managers have been conducted to upgrade staff skills. Eventually, training will be expanded to local farmers through extension services. VITA is currently discussing increased information programs with the Voice of America.

Recommendations

The greatest problem VITA faces is dealing with the overwhelming number of requests for assistance. For example, 22,784 requests for irrigation improvement have been received, but VITA has been

able to respond to only 1850 of them. VITA has received requests to improve 20930 km of rural roads, but is able to only implement 6.5 percent of them.

Another problem, related to the first, is the uncertainty expressed by Afghan local leadership that the level of financial and other support necessary to capitalize on the work already begun is inadequate.

Funding to expand the program is essential. As I stated previously, VITA moved cautiously and deliberately in setting up the program. The Agency for International Development has supported the acceleration of our activities. However, the quantum leap in projects now called for requires an increase in resources beyond the normal growth pattern in development budgets. VITA recommends an increase of 3 to 4 times the present budget. The program managers have successfully implemented larger projects both in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and VITA's administrative support system is competent to backstop it. The technical personnel are available and more are being trained.

VITA recommends a stepped up training program to ensure the availability of managers and technicians to implement a vastly increased effort by international donors to meet the food production requirements to feed returning refugees.

VITA recommends multi-year funding for the program so that the need for improved seed, insecticides, fertilizer, equipment and animals can be addressed in a more orderly, efficient and economical way than is the present case.

VITA recommends a major increase in VOA broadcast of technical information on agriculture to Afghanistan. 34 programs have already been aired, but much more is needed. VITA prepares the scripts for the broadcasts and is able to do much more if it had the broadcast time. At critical times during the year information to increase production or save crops is broadcast to Afghan farmers who listen intently.

These are a few things that would go a long way to make a fine program better. The cooperation between the Interim Government, USAID and VITA is excellent and we are confident that it will continue. We can do much more and we feel strongly that we should.

Thank you for your interest. I will be pleased to answer any questions you might have.

VOLUNTEERS IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA) was established in 1959 by engineers and scientists interested in assisting individuals and groups in developing countries become more self-reliant. Assistance is most usually rendered through direct response to questions sent to VITA by individuals and groups in developing nations. The roster of volunteers has grown to 5000 professionals with development experience and expertise in useful technologies.

VITA manages an Information Service which receives more than 1000 requests for assistance each month; more than 50 percent of these questions deal with food production or processing. More than 85,000 inquiries have received response. In addition, VITA weekly broadcasts information on technologies over the Voice of America.

VITA currently manages agriculture and rural development programs in Pakistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Liberia, Zambia, Sudan and Belize.

VITA is also designing and installing packet radio communications networks in more than a dozen countries. Most recently, VITA installed a network of six stations in Sudan, each powered by solar panels. These networks being developed in many countries will be able to uplink to VITA's low orbiting satellite, PACSAT, which will make global communications for development possible during 1990. Once in place, this communications system will greatly accelerate development programs throughout the world.

July 3, 1989

VOLUNTEERS IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

BRIEFING PAPER

AGRICULTURE SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT

Agriculture Sector Support Project started on April 1987. The study about the conditions of Afghan Agriculture started in November 1986. The purpose of the project is summarized as follows:

- A. To provide resources to support increased agricultural productivity.
- B. To support the growth of institutional mechanism to use resources.
- I. Who: Staff and Structure
 - A. Contractor is VITA, Volunteers in Technical Assistance an American private voluntary organization.
 - B. Senior project staff includes:
 - 1. Dr. Abdul Wakil, former Afghan Minister of Agriculture.
 - 2. Engineer Mohammad Sediq, former President of the Afghan Rural Development Department. COP.
 - C. Staff of over 288 qualified, trained and experienced working in Peshawar and in 14 Agricultural Rehabilitation Schemes inside Afghanistan. There are 196 professional and other technical people stationed in ARSs.
 - 1. Staff drawn heavily from pre-war employees of the Rural Development Department and the Ministry of Agriculture.
 - 2. Staff is 89% Afghan and 11% Pakistani.
 - 3. Afghan staff come from all seven Tanzeems in the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen.

4. Monitoring teams were sent to Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, Kabul and Kandahar provinces. These teams verified work on 590 VITA projects.
 5. During the war, most of the fruit orchards have been damaged. VITA initiated the rehabilitation of this cash-crop activity as part of its agricultural rehabilitation program. It was able to send 2,700 root stock of fruit trees (apple, peach, and almond) to 7 provinces in Afghanistan. As part of its reafforestation program, a total of 551,000 root cuttings of poplar and mulberry were sent to 4 provinces. These included 395,000 poplar root cuttings, and 156,000 mulberry seedlings.
- D. All staff are VITA employees and work under direct VITA supervision.

II. Where:

- A. Working in 14 Agricultural Rehabilitation Schemes (ARS's) in the south-west and the eastern quadrant of Afghanistan.
1. ARS's are in Kandahar, Ghazni, Wardak, Paktika, Baghlan, Logar, Parwan, Kabul, Takhar and Kunar provinces.
 2. Road work in Paktia, Kunar, Logar, Kandahar, Parwan and Takhar provinces.
 3. Irrigation canals rehabilitation in Logar, Ghazni, Baghlan, Takhar, Kunar, Parwan and Nangarhar provinces.

III. What:

A. Agriculture

1. Agricultural machinery
 - a. Though various channels directly and indirectly have sent into Afghanistan:
 - o 300 wheat threshers
 - o almost 200 rice huskers
 - o 1,800 water pumps
 - o \$300,000 of spare parts
 - o Over 500 bullocks
 - o 15 tractors and implements

- o seed and fertilizer for 1,000 farmers
- o Planning to send 35 tons of improved wheat seed
- o Planning to send 9,000 tons of fertilizer

2. Horticulture/Agro-forestry

- a. Established two nurseries in Pakistan for improved horticulture stock to replace stock destroyed during the war.
- b. Contracting with farmers to grow 2 million seedlings for reforestation/afforestation.

3. Voice of America broadcasts.

- o prepare broadcasts directed toward farmers and their problems.

4. Landsat

- o contracted for landsat imagery of selected agricultural areas of Afghanistan.

B. Rural Works

1. Irrigation

- o Request received = 22784
- o 421 projects mostly karezes and irrigation canals cleaned or rehabilitated up to date. Work on an additional 1449 is currently in progress out of which 590 were monitored by different methods.

2. Roads

- a. Request received - $2062 \times 15 = 30930$ km.
- b. Secondary and tertiary roads
- c. working on 400 kms of rural roads of which approximately 260 kms are completed and (foot-path) pedestrian road.
- d. We are implementing 8.5 percent of the requested projects.

C. Eleven training programs conducted for technicians and managers for up to 3 months for upgrading the capabilities of staff.

IV. How

- A. Working through local shuras in each ARS to insure allocation of project resources in line with local priorities.
- B. Emphasis on user fees rather than free distribution.
- C. Methodology of implementation planning from bottom up.

FIGURE 7

RHAJUN

STATUS REPORT
Agricultural Infrastructural Activities

June 29th, 1989


KIND OF PROJECTS	REQUESTED	SURVEYED	DESIGNED	ESTIMATED	SANCTIONED	UNDER CONSTRUCTION	SUSPENDED	COMPLETED	MONITORED
IRRIGATION									
a) Karez	12122	1956	1805	1805	1805	1399	0	406	614
b) Other	10662	240	48	48	48	39	0	9	11
TOTAL	22784	2196	1853	1853	1853	1438	0	415	625
WATER SUPPLY (POTABLE)	700	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ROADS									
a) New	456	21	16	16	6	3	0	3	6
b) Rehab.	1601	25	5	5	5	4	0	1	2
BRIDGES									
a) Motor	3345	4	4	4	4	4	0	0	0
b) Foot/Cable	19	3	6	6	2	0	0	2	2
TOTAL	28901	2249	1884	1884	1870	1449	0	421	635

NOTE:

1. Karezes under construction include 1379 inside ARS, and 20 outside of ARS.
2. The total number of irrigation projects under construction (1438) is based on reports reaching Peshawar. The actual total is probably higher, but the data is still in the field with the staff.
3. Of the projects which are either completed (421) or under construction (1449), a total of 635 or 33.9% equivalent to 34 % have been independently monitored by VITA staff to confirm that work is in progress or completed. Further, some of these subprojects have been monitored as many as three or four times.
4. Based on requests received to date for rural roads (more than 2057). The planning section has calculated these. The average length of a typical rural road is 15 KM. This figure will be used in the future for planning purposes.


VOLUNTEERS IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Agricultural Infrastructure



VOLUNTEERS IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE


Agricultural Infrastructure




June 1989



AGRICULTURE SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT
AGRICULTURE AND RURAL REHABILITATION
PROJECT



AFRICA AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
JUNE 1989



COMPLETED PROJECTS

June 29, 1989


NO	PROVINCES	WOLUSWALE S	KARIZ	OTHER IR, PRO	OTHER PROJ	MONITORED
1	KABUL	Soroobi	28			K- 28
2	LOGAR	Charkh Baraki Barak	24 39	2	1 Road Reh.	K- 24 J- 2 K- 39 R- 1
3	WARDAK	Chak Said Abad	101 27	4		K- 101 Other 4 K- 27
4	HAZNI	Ghazni Center Ander Nawa	43 39 28			K- 43 K- 39 K- 28
	PAKTI A	Said karam Jaji Maidan	10		1 Road New	K- 10 R- 1
6	PAKTIKA	Wazekhav	81			K- 81
7	KANDAHAR	Harooof Panjwai Dand Maidan	10 4 14 5	2		K- 10 K- 4 C- 2 K- 14 K- 5
8	HELMAND	Navzad	8			K- 8
	BAGHLAN	Pul-e-Khomri		1 Canal		C- 1
10	TAKHAR					
11	KONAR	Aemar			1 Cable S.N. 1 " "Reh. 2 Road New	B- 2 R- 2
12	PARWAN	Ghorband			1 M/Bridge Rehabilitation	B- 1
13	JALALABAD					
14						
15						
	TOTAL		11	9	7	477

UNDER CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

June 29, 1989

NO	PROVINCES	WOLUSWALE S	KARIZ	OTHER IR, PRO	OTHER PROJ.	MONITORED
1	KABUL	Mir Bacha Koot Shakar Dara Qara Bagha Paghman Sorgobi	41 81 7 26 23		1 Road New	K- 40 K- 43 K- 26
2	LOGAR	Charkh Baraki Barak	148 138	8 3	1 Road Reh. 1 M/Bridge 2 Feet Bridge	
3	WARDAK	Chak Said Abad	224 138			K- 31
4	GHAZNI	Ghazni Center Ander Nawa	128 186 3	1 Jui 1 Intake		K- 3
	PAKTIA	Jaji Maidan			1 Road Reh.	R- 1
6	PAKTIKA	Wasakhaw	138			
7	KANDAHAR	Harroof Panjval	39 6		1 Road Reh.	R- 1
8	HELMAND					
	BAGHLAN	Dehna-e-Ghori	1	1 canal 2 Intake		
10	TAKHAR	Farkhar Khawaja Ghar		3 canal 1 Jui	1 Road New	J- 2 R- 1
11	KONAR	Asmar		4 Jui 1 Intake	1 Road New	R- 1
12	PARWAN	Ghorband		5 Jui	1 Road Reh.	
13	JALALABAD	Hasarak	17	9 Jui		
14						
15						
	TOTAL					

AARRP
VITA



۱ لومړۍ دې د وړيا د سرې يوه برخه په دوساړۍ برخوړل شي.



۲ دا صلاح شوې غلډو پر جريو ځمکه کې د وړيا سپينې سرې يوه برخه او د اېمرټم نا سنيټ وړۍ سرې، نيمه برخه پکاره.



۳ بيا دې سمدلاسه ځمکه پر ستره قلمبه شي.



۴ په ځمکه کې دې پرېشل پخوا قلمبه شوي دې د غلډو کر په وخت کې دې نيمه برخه وړيا سپينه سره او نيمه برخه د اېمرټم نا سنيټ وړۍ سره په بريږه توګه په ټوله ځمکه پاشل شي.



۵ دوېمې د غلډو څم پکې وښودل شي او ځمکه دې مال شي.

او کله وړيا د افرامه پورې د غلډو

د احتياطت

د احتياطت

پلورنه

په غلډو سپوږمۍ برکزيټ کولای شي چې په ستر کې
لږه برخه وړيا سپينه سره او نيمه برخه د اېمرټم
نا سنيټ وړۍ سره استعمال کړي.

Additional Questions for Henry R. Norman

Submitted by Hon. Michael McNulty

QUESTION: With the continued conflict generating fresh casualties and delaying access of humanitarian organizations to people within Afghanistan, what are the views of your organization on the need for expediting a peaceful solution to the conflict.

ANSWER: To get help on a much larger scale in Afghanistan and to encourage refugees to return, the speedy resolution of the conflict is essential. In the interim, VITA works closely with Shuras, councils of local village leaders, to determine what priority needs should be tackled and how.

QUESTION: What are the constraints of working through the Afghan Interim government?

ANSWER: The principal constraints working through the interim government in the agriculture sector are that there are few people in the Ministry of Agriculture with the training and experience in agriculture and with management skills and experience. The current leadership does not seem to know what to do and appears to lack the energy, drive and knowledge to build a sensible program.

QUESTION: Has the rivalry among the resistance leaders affected your work and your priorities?

ANSWER: Yes. We are not able to provide help to areas which are being fought over by Mujadeen commanders.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA HAQ, M.D., REPRESENTATIVE, INTERNATIONAL
RESCUE COMMITTEE, WOMEN'S COMMISSION FOR REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN

I appreciate this opportunity to address the Select Committee on Hunger as a private citizen and as a representative of the International Rescue Committee's (IRC) Women's Commission on Refugee Women and Children. The Women's Commission was formed early this year to clarify the specific needs of refugee women and children in all IRC programs. In March of this year I traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan to investigate the status of Afghan women and children refugees. I met with refugees in the camps, Afghan doctors, teachers, political representatives and members of many relief organizations. My full report to the Women's Commission is included for your review. I would like to highlight some of my findings and recommendations, particularly regarding the effects of United States' humanitarian assistance on Afghan refugee women and children.

The status of Afghan refugees in Pakistan is a tribute to the international community's cooperative assistance. Most refugees have access to food, water and shelter and the majority have primary health services available. The U.S. government has provided leadership in this massive effort to provide essential needs, literally making the difference between life and death for over three million refugees.

The refugee situation is currently filled with uncertainty. Though the Soviet troops have left, an end to the war is not in sight and fighting continues to escalate. The interim government is facing many internal problems, and may not be representative of the majority of refugees. Among relief organizations it is unclear whether to focus efforts on rapid repatriation, or to plan for a much longer stay in Pakistan.

The Pakistan government continues to face economic and political strain due to the large and growing refugee population dependent on continual assistance.

In the context of these pressing and dramatic problems it is easy to lose sight of the most vulnerable and silent groups, the women, children and handicapped refugees. To understand the current problems of these groups it is useful to understand the status of Afghan women prior to the war. Motherhood is the most sought after role for women, the family is the most important institution, and women form the core of families in Afghan society. Over 90% of Afghan women are illiterate and 85% lived in rural areas of Afghanistan. Some women from urban areas had opportunities for education and there are women teachers, doctors and other professionals present in the refugee population. Life in refugee camps has resulted in the imposition of stricter behavioral codes for women. Few women are allowed outside their homes without relative male escorts and being veiled. Educational programs for women are viewed with suspicion, though in recent years increasing numbers of women have been allowed to participate due to economic benefits.

Data on the health status of these groups are not complete, but a few statistics are available. The current estimated fertility rate of 400 live births per 1000 women of childbearing age per year is the highest in the world. Fewer than 20% receive prenatal care, only 10% receive professional birth assistance. Close birth spacing leads to greater health risks for women and children. The health status of children is directly dependent on the health and educational status of their mothers. About 130 out of 1000 refugee children die before reaching their fifth birthday, compared to 300/1000 in Afghanistan and 30/1000 in the U.S. Fewer than half of refugee children are fully immunized and most do not attend school. A generation of refugee children is growing up without learning skills they will need in order to contribute to the future of their country.

The war has resulted in the creation of up to 700,000 widows and orphans, and thousands of handicapped refugees. The strong family social support system in Afghan society has traditionally cared for these most vulnerable. Due to the protracted, multiple social and economic stresses, in many cases the family's ability to care for the vulnerable has been exceeded.

In view of the above, the following recommendations regarding U.S. humanitarian aid to the Afghan refugees are suggested.

Current levels of assistance must be maintained and probably increased until full repatriation has occurred. The duration of the need for this level of assistance is unknown.

Full levels of assistance requested should be provided directly to the UN High Commissioner for refugees. The UNHCR has

carefully determined priorities and steps toward facilitating full repatriation. Funding should not be channeled primarily through the interim government as it may be some time before this or a subsequent self determined government is in control.

Substantial portions of assistance should be left flexible to allow discretionary use by reliable relief organizations. Due to the current and future uncertainty of the Afghan situation funding priorities cannot always be accurately predicted. Funding must be readily available to avert major crises in this dynamic situation.

Special programs should be developed to allow women and children to develop the skills they will need for the successful rebuilding of their homeland. The skills of all Afghans will be needed for successful rebuilding of their devastated homeland. Training programs should begin now, as they will be much more difficult once dispersion of the refugees begins. Women's representation should be sought in all levels of assistance programs.

Provision of primary health care services, and training of primary health care workers should be increased to full capacity. Efforts should be made to immunize all children and women prior to repatriation and to provide life saving health education. Primary health care workers should be trained with the recognition that they will be the major providers of health care services in rural Afghanistan.

Vulnerable groups and individuals who need special assistance should be identified prior to repatriation. Current numbers and locations of these individuals are unknown.

Every effort should be made to facilitate the negotiation of a political settlement to the 10 year war. Increased militarization and escalation of fighting will only lead to more deaths and disabilities. All Afghans want a rapid return to peace.

**Report to Women's Commission for Refugee
Women and Children
International Rescue Committee**

Status of Afghan Women and Children Refugees
Cynthia Lawrence Haq M.D., March 1989

Imagine you are a 36 year old Afghan woman living in a refugee camp just outside Peshawar, Pakistan. Nine years ago, you and your family fled your home in rural Afghanistan fearing for your lives. A brutal civil war was raging, your brother had been killed, your husband was imprisoned, bombings around your village were commonplace, and the countryside was littered with land mines. You gathered a few possessions which could be carried and traveled with your four young children, your husband's parents, your brother and sister-in-law and their five children over the cold and snowy Afghan mountains by foot for five days until you reached the relative safety of a refugee camp in Pakistan. Two members of your family died in route; your brother in a land mine accident, and your three year old daughter from pneumonia.

After one year in the camp you were joined by your husband. Since then you have had three more children. Your life consists of caring for your seven children, your husband's parents and supporting your widowed sister-in-law and her children. You live in a small mud hut which you and your family built after arrival. Food and water are scarce, but available through rations. Since your husband was fortunate to find a job building roads outside Peshawar, your family has some money to buy other foods. You are able to obtain medical care at a health center located on the periphery of the camp. Your three sons attend school in the camp in the mornings. Your daughters stay home with you as the mullahs say that schooling for girls and women is contrary to the teachings of Islam. Since you never attended school, you are unable to read or write. You are unable to leave the confines of your compound unless completely covered by veil.

You and your family are very unhappy here. You feel trapped with little freedom to move about, scarce necessities and an uncertain future. You have heard that your village was destroyed and the war continues. You

have no idea when you will be able to return to your devastated homeland, or what rules the next political regime will enforce. You often feel helpless and hopeless.

This scenario comes from the true life story of an Afghan woman living in Nasir Bagh camp interviewed in February, 1989.

During the last week of February, 1989, by invitation of the Women's Commission on Refugee Women and Children of the International Rescue Committee, I visited Peshawar, Pakistan to investigate the status of Afghan women and children refugees, to identify needs and begin program planning for repatriation.

Discussions were held with the following groups and individuals:

Afghan women, men and children refugees of Nasir Bagh and Gondolf camps in the Northwest Frontier province of Pakistan.

Drs. Momand, Turner and other physician and nursing staff of the Afghan Obstetric and Gynaecology Hospital, Peshawar.

Principal Tajwar Kakar, teachers and students of the Lycee Malalai secondary school for Afghan refugee girls.

Dr. Rachman Zumeni and physician and community health worker staff of Gondolf camp (Austrian relief committee).

Mr. Thomas Yates, Director; Mr. Steven Segal, Deputy Director; Ms. Susan Yates and Ms. Charlotte Albers International Rescue Committee.

Mr. Ted Albers, Executive Coordinator ACBAR (Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief) Beverly Fleming, secretariat, and members of ACBAR Health Subcommittee.

Dr. Lillian Rachlin and Sheila Ludjens RN of the International Medical Corps.

Ms. Margaret Segal, Education Coordinator, Development Center for Afghan Education.

Theresa Molyneux, Mother-Child Centre Coordinator, Afifa Wardak and other teachers of the International Rescue Committee and Bernard van Leer Foundation.

Margaret Sinclair, Program officer; Anitha Ronstrom, Master Trainer UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees).

Kerry Connor, Ph.D. UNICEF.

Jean Canby, R.N., Community Health Programmer Serve.

Chief Minister Aftad Sherpao, Northwest Frontier Province, Pakistan.

INTRODUCTION

Since 1979 more than seven million Afghans have had to abandon their homes to seek asylum from war. Over 70% of the refugee and internally displaced populations are women and children.

Early in 1989 the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children of the International Rescue Committee was formed to investigate and exclusively target the needs of refugee women and children throughout the world. In February I traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan, to investigate the status of Afghan women and children refugees and to identify areas of need. The purpose of this report is to briefly summarize the status of women and children refugees, identify problems, and to suggest strategies which might help currently, and during repatriation. I have relied heavily on the experience and knowledge of Nancy Dupree and the above mentioned individuals, and am thankful for their time and frankness with me. As a mother and family physician, I am familiar with maternal-child family and health issues. Being Pakistani, I am familiar with many of the cultural issues affecting Afghan women.

This report is not designed to provide a comprehensive overview of the Afghan refugee's situation and problems. For this the reader is referred to the First Consolidated Report from the office of the United Nations Co-ordinator for humanitarian and economic assistance programmes relating to Afghanistan by Sadruddin Aga Khan. Nor is it designed to comprehensively address problems of repatriation; for this the reader is referred to the first and second reports of the Citizen's Commission on

Afghan Refugees available from the International Rescue Committee. Instead, this report will focus on problems specific to Afghan women and children refugees.

STATUS OF AFGHAN WOMEN AND CHILDREN REFUGEES

Cultural status

In order to fully understand the status and problems of Afghan women and children, it is important to keep in mind the traditional roles and responsibilities women have maintained, and how these have changed over time. Motherhood is the most sought after role for women, the family is the most important institution, and women are the core of families in Afghan society. The roles of women in urban and rural society differ, and have changed over time (1).

In pre-war Afghanistan rural women lived in kin-related segments of villages and were free to move about, usually wearing long scarves, but rarely completely veiled. They participated in light agricultural tasks, processing of grains, wool and vegetables, and some harvesting. They also cared for children and the home. Women rarely were schooled or participated directly in money making activities.

Urban women prior to 1959 were more strictly confined to domestic and reproductive activities and the confines of their homes. They rarely ventured out without a male escort, or when completely veiled. Early in the 20th century a movement for more equitable women's rights began and developed into the passage of marriage laws, discouragement of the veil, and women's participation in development, education and medicine. Religious opposition feared that increased female mobility would lead to the breakdown of Islamic social order. Despite periodic setbacks, the 1964 constitution guaranteed women equal rights, and 1977 Civil Law provided women protection against forced marriages. The laws were not universally enforced, and the pattern of male domination continued in most areas. Following the coup by leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, promises for a new era providing absolute equality for women were made but few tangible benefits were seen. Women became more visible in public, and party members were able to join the university. Many members of Afghan society viewed the increased visibility of women in public with extreme distaste, and associated programs to

educate women and girls as communistic undermining of the fabric of their society (1).

Women refugees have experienced the imposition of stricter behavioral codes. Because refugee camps are not closely kin related, as were most villages in Afghanistan, any movement of women outside their homes is viewed as risky, and generally allowed only with a relative male escort, veiled and under close supervision. Urban refugee women enjoy greater freedom, but are seen in public less often than prior to the war, and must keep their heads covered at all times in mixed company. Educational programs for women had been viewed with suspicion and associated with communism. Because of these constraints, educational and development programs directed towards women must be undertaken with caution, and after obtaining approval from male leaders in the camps. During recent years more women have been encouraged and allowed to take advantage of professional opportunities due to economic benefits.

Health Status of Women

It is estimated that there are over five million Afghan women and children refugees. Basic health indicators reflecting the health status of all Afghan refugee women and children are not available but a few surveys have been performed. From surveys of 10 camps in 1987, the current estimated fertility rate of 400 live births per 1000 women of childbearing age is the highest in the world. If this rate continues unchanged, Afghan women will average 13.6 live births during their childbearing years.

During the time of the survey one out of four women of childbearing age was pregnant. Of these, 19% received prenatal care. Only 3.5% of women had received tetanus immunization. Less than 10% of women received professional birth assistance (trained traditional birth attendant, health worker or hospital delivery). Maternal mortality rates are unavailable, but in 1987 1.3 out of every 100 women reported a maternal death during childbirth among their relatives (2).

Given the high fertility rate of Afghan refugee women, many potential problems result. Close spacing of pregnancies results in lower birth weights of infants, a greater tendency for maternal and child malnutrition and greater rates of maternal anemia and birth complications. Of women surveyed in 1987, over 60% favored the idea of child spacing, but only 3%

employed child spacing methods. Further exploration of women's and men's attitudes toward child spacing could lead to the offering of child spacing programs that are acceptable and used by greater numbers.

Availability of basic health services for women in the camps is generally good, and over time trust has been established leading to greater utilization. Only one hospital devoted to the health needs of Afghan women exists in Peshawar, the Afghan Obstetric and Gynaecology Hospital. Established in 1984, the hospital serves women in prenatal care, delivery and gynaecological surgery. Since its establishment, patient volume has grown steadily, with over 10,000 out patient visits, 1000 deliveries, and 100 major surgeries in 1987. Despite the hospital's success in growth, funding cuts have threatened curtailments in services rendered.

The existence of a cadre of health professionals able to serve the health needs of Afghan women, upon their return to Afghanistan, is crucial to prevent dramatic increases in maternal-child morbidity and mortality. The need exists for further training of female health workers at all levels, continued surveillance of women's health status and efforts to immunize all women of childbearing age against tetanus.

Health Status of Children

In 1987, 22 out of 1000 infants born died in their first month of life, and 104 out of 1000 children died before their fifth birthday. This represents a significant reduction of infant and child mortality rates since 1979. High birth rates, coupled with lower infant and child mortality rates have led to extremely rapid population growth among the refugee population and a greater proportion of dependent children to adults.

Moderate to severe malnutrition was present in approximately 12% of children in the camps. Vaccination rates of children with BCG was 79%, measles 64%, and fully for DPT/Polio was 25% (2). Diarrhea, dehydration, measles, tuberculosis, respiratory infections, polio, trachoma, typhoid fever and neonatal tetanus are still common among the refugees.

Despite serious and persistent health problems, due to the efforts of Afghans, voluntary agencies and support from the Government of Pakistan, overall health status and access to health services of women and children refugees has been considerably improved over pre-war Afghanistan.

Coordination and continuation of health services currently available will become more difficult as refugees return to Afghanistan. Efforts to immunize as many children as possible prior to the move should be continued. The training of community health workers, who will probably be the main source of medical care available in rural areas, should be continued with this fact in mind.

Vulnerable Groups

Up to a million people have been killed in the ten year war in Afghanistan, more than 60% of the losses have been adult males. This has resulted in the creation of up to 700,000 widows and orphans. Additionally, due to the protracted war and heavy civilian casualties, there are thousands of handicapped men, women and children refugees. Because of a closely knit extended family system that has existed in Afghanistan for generations, the majority of needy individuals are expected to be cared for within their families. Because of the large numbers of dependent children, widows and handicapped, the extended family's ability to absorb and adequately care for all in need will likely be exceeded. Accurate estimates of the number of refugees with special needs and their location do not exist. Training of Afghans, who could identify needy individuals, and help in coordination of services after repatriation, could insure that these groups receive the special services they require.

Educational Status

Over 90% of Afghan women are illiterate, and 85% are from rural areas of Afghanistan. The use of child spacing methods and the health of children, is directly related to maternal educational status. Education of women is not contrary to the teachings of Islam. Due to the limited mobility of adult women in refugee camps, educational programs targeted at adult women have met with very limited success, but have been successful with some urban refugees. Most of the refugee camps contain schools for children, and efforts are underway to standardize curriculae. Young boys commonly attend grade school, and many have the opportunity to attend secondary schools. Young girls rarely attend grade school, and if they do the attrition rate as they reach higher grades is great. Some school programs for girls have been more successful when *mullahs* (religious teachers) have been employed as teachers. Only one secondary school for refugee girls exists in Peshawar, the Lycee Malalai school with just over

100 students. The formation and operation of secondary schools for young women has generated political controversy, resulting in temporary forced closures. Post secondary educational opportunities for men and women are limited, restricting professional development of this important sector of Afghan society. Despite the difficulties associated with development and delivery of appropriate school curriculae to children and young adults, the opportunity to receive education, for those interested and permitted is crucial. Teacher training in preparation for repatriation must occur throughout the school systems to insure program continuity. Interaction of professionals inside Afghanistan with refugees is currently limited. It is difficult to predict to what extent professionals within Afghanistan will be able to fulfill the needs of local and refugee populations following repatriation.

Recommendations

The brief summary above, emphasizes some of the current and anticipated problems for Afghan refugee women and children. Many of these problems are being addressed by the Afghans themselves, the Pakistan government, and voluntary agencies. Through incredible international efforts and cooperation, major catastrophes among the refugee population have been averted. Some of the specific needs of women and children refugees have not been addressed, either because of other pressing priorities, lack of resources, cultural constraints making work with women difficult, or non-recognition of the special needs of women. By addressing the special needs of women and children refugees, Afghan society can be strengthened and rehabilitated throughout. Below are recommendations for a few programs which are felt to be priorities, but are not inclusive of all needed programs, or ones that are already being addressed.

Women's Social Service Center

There is currently no mechanism that exists in the refugee population that allows women to interact, share ideas and develop their own programs. There are a number of educated and professional Afghan women living in Pakistan who plan to return to Afghanistan as soon as possible. By facilitating the interaction of women who can articulate their own problems, develop ideas for programs, and begin these to carry on following repatriation, women will be given a voice, and the opportunity to

participate in development planning. To insure the support of male leaders it is important that this forum be constructed in a culturally sensitive way. Development of a **women's social service center** in Peshawar could serve as the central body for professional associations of teachers, health workers and women with other special interests. Due to economic, cultural and transportation constraints, external economic support of this group would be essential for its development.

Identifying Vulnerable Groups

The large numbers of **handicapped** individuals will require special programs to help with their achievement of rehabilitation and self sufficiency. Before effective programs can be developed and implemented, these individuals must first be identified, and their needs assessed. The first task of the Women's Social Service Center could be to begin planning for and identification of these individuals. Training of Afghan community social workers who could identify vulnerable families, and refer them to the appropriate social service agencies is critical in coordinating services for these needy individuals.

Widows, particularly mothers with dependent children, form another large group with special needs. Identification of these women could also be achieved by Afghan community workers. The development of mechanisms for these widows to achieve economic self sufficiency through agricultural, tailoring or handicraft programs will decrease their dependency and vulnerability, and could be identified by the widows and their community workers, and coordinated through the women's social service center.

Teaching Programs

The importance of **educational opportunities for male and female children** of all ages cannot be overemphasized. Despite the limited acceptance of education for girls, efforts should continue to enhance female participation. Successful programs which have achieved cultural acceptability, by incorporating *mullahs* (religious teachers) into curricular development should be expanded.

The role of education as enhancing the *jihad* and individual's abilities to serve others should be stressed. Political leaders who favor education of all children should be encouraged to speak in its support. If ways of making education culturally acceptable can be found, the ability to reach women and children will be enhanced.

Women should be recruited for training as community health workers, teachers, traditional birth attendants and social workers. The training of male community health workers has been very successful in many camps, and in some areas, males are accepted readily when they are the only choice available for provision of health care. Through the training of women, the majority of Afghan women and children be reached optimally.

Health Needs

Efforts to **vaccinate all women and children** prior to repatriation should be increased, as provision of immunizations will become more difficult following dispersion of the population to rural areas. Health education should be provided as a priority in conjunction with curative care, and throughout the school curriculae.

Exploration of **attitudes towards child spacing** should be carried out. Provision of child spacing techniques and education should be provided to those who are interested.

Availability of **basic health services** to all in the camps should be continued with the knowledge that the number of refugees in the camps may grow in the upcoming months if fighting continues in Afghanistan. Reduction in camp services should begin only after the refugees are clearly returning, and plans for mobilizing health teams to Afghanistan should begin now. The funding for successful programs, such as the Afghan OBS/ GYN Hospital in Peshawar, should not be curtailed.

Women's Representation

Afghan women refugees are for the most part, a silent and unseen group. In order to best understand their needs, and implement their ideas they must be heard. An effort should be made to obtain **women's**

representation at all levels of refugee and repatriation program planning. Coordinators of women's and children's affairs should be appointed by the Pakistan and interim Afghan governments, and in voluntary agencies. A mechanism for communication among these women's representatives should be established for optimal coordination of efforts. Every effort should be made to allow Afghan women to speak for themselves.

.....

References

1. Dupree, N. H. Women in Afghanistan. Preliminary Needs Assessment. Prepared for the United Nations Development Fund for Women, August 1988
2. Krijgh, E. Health Status of Afghan Women and Children. An assessment of trends in 10 refugee camps between Hangu and Thal, Northwest Frontier Province, Pakistan. 1987

Additional Questions for Catherine O'Neill

Submitted by Hon. Michael McNulty

Question. The IRC has been a moving force in establishing a citizen's commission on Afghanistan. What is the commission's assessment of the extent of humanitarian needs and the necessary levels of U.S. Government commitment?

Answer. The Citizens Commission for Afghan Refugees has spoken extensively to people who have been inside Afghanistan, most especially the Swedish committee which has prepared an extensive report on the wide-ranging damage to the infrastructure of the country. The countryside has been virtually destroyed, people are forced to move to population centers for both protection and to insure food supplies which must be airlifted into the country, since normal agriculture is impossible.

The Citizens Commission has been a leading supporter of continuing to assist the long suffering Afghan people. However, we have consistently noted that the least political form of support, given the civil war currently raging in the country, is to help the Afghan people by supporting various United Nations programs, most especially the Secretary General's Special Coordinator and his appeal for Afghanistan. Sadly, the United States has fallen behind other industrial countries in responding to this humanitarian appeal. The Government of Japan has recently committed \$60 million toward the rebuilding of Afghanistan to Sadruddin Aga Khan, the U.N. Special Coordinator.

Question. In the article in the International Herald Tribune, you state that the military commanders, dissatisfied with the interim government, are directly contacting relief agencies and agreeing to accept foreign monitors to ensure that relief funds are not used to finance civil wars and turf battles. In your opinion, what is the reputation of the Afghan interim government as an agency performing humanitarian services?

Answer. The Afghan interim government exists in theory only. Even this week's news reports indicate that the "Minister's" for the government can only be contacted by being in touch with U.S. Government offices. When the Citizen's Commission talked with the Acting Prime Minister and asked him what were his specific plans for the reconstruction of his country, he laughed and referred us to a U.S. A.I.D. official for "the details."

One cannot overlook the demonstrated unwillingness of those associated with the AIG to support at all programs which enhance the humanitarian status of women. Death threats are commonly received by those who suggest establishing programs for women.

The United States risks isolating itself from all other western governments in the way it is currently responding to this crisis.

Afghanistan needs peace and rebuilding. Every dollar the United States allocates for this war increases the death and destruction, increases widespread hunger--the New York Times recently wrote that there are those who believe the United States is underwriting a policy of starvation for Kabul--increases the number of widows, orphaned, and maimed.

Two things need to be done urgently to insure that humanitarian intentions guide our activity now that the political situation has changed with the Soviet withdrawal.

One. A congressional audit of U.S. funding of Afghan related programs is essential to accurately inform the Congress of how the funds are used.

Two. Current funding programs for Afghan related concerns need to be re-evaluated by the Congress in line with realistic U.S. humanitarian and political goals in the region.

AFGHANISTAN: QUESTIONING THE FUTURE

Overview

Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a momentous accord in Geneva on April 14, 1988. The terms of the accord, guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet Union provided for the withdrawal of 115,000 Soviet troops from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989. Both the Iran based and the Pakistan based resistance parties, also called the mujaheddin, have been fighting the Kabul regime since 1979. The Pakistan based resistance has been provided military aid by the United States via Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Pakistan's intelligence bureau. The mujaheddin have formed an interim government based in Pakistan, which has been officially recognized by United States and Pakistan. The U.S. intelligence community initially estimated that the Kabul regime would fall 6 to 12 months after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. However, these estimates are now being questioned -- the resistance groups have been unable to take Jalalabad, a major city controlled by the Kabul regime, in spite of engaging in a four-month siege of that city. The UN has specially appointed Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan as the UN Coordinator for Humanitarian and Economic Assistance to Afghanistan. He is responsible for the supervision of the UN's efforts to repatriate refugees and reconstruct the economy. The Coordinator has organized six factfinding missions to Afghanistan to assess the situation. The U.S. has provided bilateral humanitarian assistance for refugee camps in Pakistan and for cross-border programs from Pakistan to Afghanistan.

* The Reconstruction of Afghanistan

Afghanistan (1987 population: 14.7 million) has historically been one of the world's poorest nations; the war has shattered an already fragile economy. Two million people have fled their homes to other places within Afghanistan; 7 million have crossed the border to Pakistan and Iran. Estimates of deaths due to the war range between 500,000 and 1.3 million. As the war continues, refugee camps in Pakistan are overflowing with its victims. This year, in the months of March and April, 25,000 new refugees arrived in Pakistan.

When the refugees begin to return to Afghanistan, adequate health facilities, education, food and water will have to be provided. Animal breeding and poultry farming have come to a standstill and the lack of fields under cultivation is causing a food shortage. Afghanistan has little medical infrastructure and inadequate sanitation and water. There are at least fifteen types of antipersonnel mines and five types of antitank explosives deployed throughout the country, posing a grave threat to the safety of its inhabitants. The costs of reconstruction will be high. Roads, bridges and villages will have to be reconstructed. Between 12,000 and 22,000 villages have been destroyed or abandoned. The Afghans will also need seeds and agricultural equipment. The UN estimates that, for the repatriation of 3 million refugees alone, \$325.53 million will be required. Some have suggested that over \$1.5 billion will be required in the first four years of reconstruction alone.

The UN coordinated program headed by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, has been made responsible for the task of reconstruction. The Soviet Union has agreed to give the UN \$600 million for this purpose. Japan has pledged \$60 million. However, the United States has donated only \$17 million. Some critics have suggested that the U.S. should support the UN strongly in its efforts to make the aid venture truly international and neutral. The continuing war prevents the U.N. and the private voluntary organizations from implementing their plans for rehabilitation and reconstruction in Afghanistan.

* Women and Children

In 1985, Afghanistan had the highest infant mortality rate (173 per thousand) and the highest under five mortality rate (304 per thousand) in the world. The literacy rate for women is eight percent. The 6.8 million children under the age of 16 in Afghanistan make up almost half the total

population. Some of the underlying causes behind these statistics are primitive educational and health facilities, inadequate drinking water, malnutrition, and high maternal mortality.

There are 5 million women and children refugees in Pakistan, comprising 70% percent of the refugee population. Life in a refugee camp is especially hard for a woman because the system of purdah (the tradition of veiling women when they step outside the home) forces her to be confined in the cramped quarters of a mud hut all day. In pre-war Afghanistan, life was easier because the houses are generally built around a spacious courtyard and there were other female relatives at home. Also, in the camps, there are few female medical personnel and inadequate medical facilities for women.

In Afghanistan, the situation is desperate. The fundamentalist mujaheddin, at times, have not permitted female medical personnel to work in Afghanistan, which effectively prevented women from receiving medical care. Some medical workers have estimated that 90% of the women suffer from depression or some other form of mental disease. Two American nurses, who worked in the Paktia province, reported that 110 to 150 women and children came to their clinics for treatment everyday. Many of these women and children had walked for a day and a half to reach the clinic. Malnutrition is common among the children and many of the women suffer from diseases beyond treatment, including uterine and ovarian cancers. Women in their twenties have high blood pressure. Respiratory diseases, tuberculosis, malaria and skin diseases are also common.

Due to the war, middle-class women have been forced to take those jobs in hospitals and schools that the soldiers of war would have otherwise occupied. They have been educated, have discarded their veils and adopted Western customs. The Communists advocate a more visible role for women in this traditional Muslim society. Many women oppose a fundamentalist Islamic order, fearing that the mujaheddin will force them to revert to traditional Islamic strictures. Religious laws would keep women confined to their homes, veiled and uneducated.

* Nature of Government:

Now that the Soviets have withdrawn their troops, it is expected that the nature of government within Afghanistan will change. The mujahedeen are divided into several parties based in Iran and Pakistan. The interim government formed by the seven party alliance in Peshawar, Pakistan has been recognized by Pakistan and the United States. Sibghatullah Mojaddidi, a moderate, has been elected to the largely ceremonial post of the President while Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a hard-line fundamentalist, was appointed Prime Minister.

The mujaheddin's ability to form a stable and unified government has been questioned by some scholars and the media. The guerrillas are divided into 13 separate political groups, two branches of the muslim faith - Shi'ite and Sunni muslims - and several ethnicities. The Pakistan based alliance, which is supplied with military aid from the U.S., consists of seven Sunni muslim groups, three of which are fundamentalist while four are traditionalist. The traditionalist groups believe that religion and state are separate, while the fundamentalists want to rule the country by the Koran. The interim government, formed by this alliance, does not have any representation from Shi'ite muslims who form 15 to 20% of the population in Afghanistan, nor has it been endorsed by the Shi'ite resistance groups in Iran. The local commanders based within Afghanistan are dissatisfied with the decisions of the Pakistan based alliance and the interim government. Even some major resistance groups within Pakistan are unhappy about the composition of the interim government. Scholars such as Selig Harrison, from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggest that after the war, the country may be divided into regions controlled by local commanders on lines of ethnicity, tribe or religion.

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the communist party headed by Najibullah, currently controls most of the major cities in Afghanistan. Soviet troops, having invaded Afghanistan in 1979, supported the current regime against the mujaheddins until their withdrawal in February 1989. A proposal calling for a broad-based government is being promoted by UN Under-Secretary General Diego Cordovez. It envisages a transitional "National Government

for Peace and Reconstruction" composed of reputable Afghans not connected with any factions. Within six months, the government would convene a *Loi Jirga* or traditional tribal assembly empowered to constitute a new government. The proposal has received support from the field commanders (who receive arms from the alliance based in Peshawar, Pakistan), Zahir Shah (the king deposed in 1973) and some nationalists within the Peshawar alliance. The Soviet Union has agreed to support the proposal, provided anti-Soviet Islamic fundamentalists are barred from important positions. However, the fundamentalists have rejected it.

• The Mujaheddin:

The mujaheddin, although supported by Pakistan and the U.S., are losing the popular support of the Afghans themselves. The Pakistan based mujaheddin have lost popularity with the Afghans due to reports of drug trafficking and blackmarketing in American aid weapons. In a poll cited by Selig Harrison in his testimony to a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee in June 1989, over 70% of the refugees polled in Pakistan wanted Zahir Shah to lead the government. Individual resistance leaders polled one percent or less.

A number of the major resistance leaders want to keep the Afghan women in purdah and are outspokenly anti-Western. The Financial Times (23 June, 1989) stated that fundamentalist resistance leader Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami (allotted 25% of the total U.S. weapons supply by Pakistan) has been accused of throwing acid in women's faces for not wearing the veil in mid-1970s.

In violation of the Geneva accords, both the Soviet Union and the US have been supplying military aid to the Kabul regime and the mujaheddins respectively. Press reports assert that Soviet built Scud missiles and Antonov cargo planes (flying at altitudes well above the U.S. Stinger missile's maximum range) have inflicted considerable injuries on the mujaheddin in their attempt to take Jalalabad. Recently, the Kabul regime has scored some military victories against the mujaheddin. Since 1979, the U.S. has channelled over \$2 billion to the resistance through the CIA, most of it in weapons. The Soviets had provided the Kabul regime with \$1.6 billion in military aid between 1979 and 1986. This year, they have been giving Kabul defense equipment valued between \$200 to \$300 million a month.

• U.S. Policy in Afghanistan:

Since 1979, the U.S. government has spent over \$761.5 million for Afghan relief. Most of this support has been for the refugee camps in Pakistan (\$600 million) and for cross-border operations through private voluntary organizations. It has been alleged that the U.S. has pressured UN authorities into considering the mujaheddin fighters who often cross the border as refugees, thus, giving them the relief aid that refugees normally receive. In FY 89, the U.S. allocated \$95 million for its cross-border humanitarian program and \$55 million to UNHCR (High Commissioner on Refugees), largely in food aid. The U.S. has deliberately channelled most of the cross-border aid through the seven party alliance in Pakistan. Also, the Foreign Assistance Act includes a provision that bars expenditure of emergency refugee funds through the "Soviet controlled government of Afghanistan."

The U.S. supports the Pakistan based alliance and recognizes the interim government as the future government of Afghanistan. In a recent hearing, a State Department official stated that "the U.S. continues to support the right of the Afghan people to self-determination." However, the mujaheddin are rapidly losing popularity among the Afghans. Also, the press has consistently reported that anti-American sentiment is growing as more U.S. supplied missiles replace Soviet weapons as the killer of civilians.

The U.S. has channelled weapons and ammunition to the mujaheddin through Pakistan's ISI. It has been asserted that ISI has deliberately channelled most weapons to those groups in the alliance that are fundamentalist. In 1975, these groups fled to Pakistan and linked with ISI when they were persecuted by Zahir Shah's successor, Mohammed Daud. Pakistan's approach to funnelling military aid to the mujaheddin has also been influenced by a desire to prevent the formation of a Pashtun

government in Afghanistan because of historical differences with the Pashtun tribe. Thus, ISI has channelled most military aid to Hekmatyar and Rabbani whose groups are fundamentalist and ironically, anti-American. Hekmatyar's party is now considered to be one of the most well-equipped and disciplined parties in the alliance. The appointment of the new envoy Peter Tomsen, who will communicate directly with the mujaheddin, instead of through the ISI, may signal a change in U.S. policy.

7/26/89

NATURE OF GOVERNMENT

